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Banking On the Market: Relying On
Depositors to Control Bank Risks
Helen A. Gartent
The idea of market discipline' is currently very much in vogue in bank-
ing law reform circles.' The notion that bank depositors can be
encouraged to evaluate the risk posture of banks3 in the same way that
securities investors choose stocks" borrows heavily from modern financial
theory that has demonstrated that the market for corporate securities is
remarkably efficient in reflecting investors' risk preferences.' In order to
attract deposits, bank management would be forced to limit risk-taking,
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1. The term "market discipline" is commonly used as shorthand for the complex process by which
suppliers of capital-here, bank depositors-are believed to make decisions as to their allocation of
funds among investment opportunities. Suppliers of capital will assess alternative investments with a
view to both their expected return-the amount of profits the investment is likely to generate-and
their risk-the probability that such profits will in fact materialize. The greater the risk associated
with a particular investment, the less attractive it becomes to investors, and the higher the return it
must offer in order to tempt anyone to invest. Put another way, depositors should "discipline" banks
that exhibit too much risk by demanding higher returns, or "risk premiums," or by refusing to invest
at all; such banks in turn should be forced to reduce their risk-taking in order to attract and keep
deposits.
2. See, e.g., G. BENSTON, R. EISENBEIS, P. HoRvrrz, E. KANE & G. KAUFMAN, PERSPEcTiVES
ON SAFE AND SOUND BANKING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 314 (1986) [hereinafter ABA STUDY]
(study commissioned by the American Bankers Association recommending increased reliance on mar-
ket discipline). Even bank regulators have suggested the efficacy of greater reliance on market forces
to control bank risk. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Disclosure of Financial and Other
Information Regarding National Banks, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
86,011 (July 16, 1984) [hereinafter Comptroller Statement] (calling for greater disclosure to assist
depositors in making more responsible investment decisions).
3. A bank's risk posture is the degree of risk associated with a depositor's investment in that bank.
This risk arises from the bank's subsequent investment of depositors' funds in loans, securities, and
other ventures. Any increase in the variation of return on the bank's own investment portfolio has a
direct effect on the income prospects of the bank's investors. Thus, depositors have a reason to be
attentive to bank management's risk-taking in order to assess their own risk. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 32-34.
4. Bank depositors have been selected as candidates rather than bank securities holders because
banks rely primarily on deposits for funding; moreover, theoretically at least, bank securities holders
are already exerting discipline. See infra note 29.
5. See generally Lintner, A Model of a Perfectly Functioning Securities Market, in ECONOMIC
POLICY AND THE RE(;ULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 143 (H. Manne ed. 1969); W. LLEWEL-
LEN, THE COST OF CAPITAl. 8-18 (1969).
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thereby voluntarily achieving what fifty years of government regulation
have failed to produce-a safer banking system.6
Most recent discussion of market discipline has concerned its implemen-
tation. Thus, proponents of market discipline have proposed increased
public disclosure by banks about their financial condition to enable depos-
itors to make informed decisions about bank risk.' Opponents have voiced
concern that more disclosure about banking problems may interfere with
the efforts of bank regulators to maintain public confidence in the banking
industry. 8
Curiously, neither proponents nor opponents of market discipline have
questioned whether, in fact, market discipline by depositors will work in
practice as it is supposed to work in theory9 and as it is thought to occur
in the corporate securities market." It is assumed that depositors will
demand high risk premiums from or avoid those banks that incur too
much risk, thus creating a system of rewards and penalties for risk man-
agement that will affect banks' future behavior. Although observers may
disagree as to whether reliance on the deposit market is the best way to
6. See, e.g., Mathewson, From Confidential Supervision to Market Discipline: The Role of Dis-
closure in the Regulation of Commercial Banks, 11 J. CORP. L. 139, 141 (1986) (discussing market
discipline as an alternative to government regulation of banks). The recent popularity of market disci-
pline reflects concern over burgeoning risk at banking institutions that traditional bank regulation
seems unable to harness. Reports of bank failures, poor industry earnings, and bad loans have fed the
perception that banking risk is out of control. See, e.g., Luke, BankAmerica Suspends Common Divi-
dend As Loss Pushes 1985 Deficit to $337 Million, Am. Banker, Jan. 22, 1986, at 1, col. 2;
BancTexas Takes $35.4 Million Loss in 1985, Am. Banker, Jan. 22, 1986, at 3, col. 2. In 1985
alone, more than 110 of the nation's 15,000 banks failed, the largest annual number since 1937.
Schifrin, Banks and Thrifts, FORBMS, Jan. 13, 1986, at 73.
7. See Comptroller Statement, supra note 2; Murphy, Bank Supervision and Regulation in the
Sunshine: Issues Regarding the Increased Disclosure of Information on Individual Banks, in FED-
ERAL. RESERVE POLICIES AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 83, 86-87 (R. Erb ed. 1978).
8. Fears have been expressed that depositors may misunderstand certain bank disclosures and
overreact to negative news. See Mathewson, supra note 6, at 174-77.
9. Of course, proponents of market discipline admit that depositors do not now exert this disci-
pline, but they blame the intervention of regulatory devices such as deposit insurance and federally
assisted mergers of failed banks for dulling depositors' incentives. See ABA STUDY, supra note 2, at
175. This Article argues, however, that the blame is misplaced. Even now, few-if any-depositors
count on the protection afforded by federal intervention to prevent bank failure, as is vividly demon-
strated by the frequency of bank runs; moreover, even without this protection, depositor discipline still
will not produce the salutary effects its proponents claim for it. See infra text accompanying notes
131-76.
10. See sources cited supra note 5.
Vol. 4: 129, 1986
Banking on the Market
police bank risk,1" no one has doubted the ability of depositors to exert
this pressure. 2
This Article examines and ultimately rejects the assumption that depos-
itor discipline will cause banks to control their risk-taking. In order for
such a process to occur, three preconditions must exist that, although
present in the corporate securities market, are not now present in the de-
posit market. First, there must be a group of investors for whom risk is
the primary consideration in choosing an investment. Part I demonstrates
that most bank depositors are not investors in this sense at all, but are
concerned with factors other than risk when they select a bank. 8 Those
depositors who do meet this definition of an investor are a relatively small
group concentrated in only the very largest banks. 4
Second, investors must have access to the information they deem rele-
vant to their investment decisions. Part II demonstrates that the market
already generates sufficient information about banks' financial condition to
permit the interested depositor to evaluate the present risk posture of at
least the major banking institutions.' Moreover, there is considerable evi-
dence that investors in bank deposits do in fact use this information.'
Nevertheless, investors are equally concerned about the final disposition of
their bank in the event of unanticipated failure.1 7 Determining whether a
bank is more likely to be liquidated, resulting in losses for its uninsured
depositors, or to be saved through a federally assisted merger or capital
injection, insuring protection in full of all depositors,'" is essential to eval-
uating the risks associated with an investment. 9 Yet this determination
11. Most attacks on market discipline have focused on the cost of implementation to the banking
system, including the expense of additional mandatory disclosure and the likelihood of additional bank
failure, at least in the short run. See ABA STruDY, supra note 2, at 199-200. Moreover, some reform-
ers have suggested that depositor discipline must be supplemented by alternative sources of market
discipline such as risk-based deposit insurance premiums or mandatory subordinated capital. Never-
theless, depositor discipline remains a popular suggestion, both because it would require fewer legisla-
tive changes than these other alternatives and because, without pressure from the deposit market,
other forms of discipline may be too weak to affect bank behavior.
12. This certainty is puzzling in view of the paucity of empirical and other academic studies of
the likely effects of depositor discipline. See Forrestal, Bank Safety: Risks and Responsibilities, FED.
RESENVE BANK OF AI.ANrA EX)N. REV., Aug. 1985, at 5, 10 (suggesting need for further study);
ABA S'ruDy, supra note 2, at 184-85 (describing limitations of empirical research into depositor
behavior).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 39-43.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 48-56.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 70-79.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 84-95.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 111-21.
18. For a description of the various possible regulatory dispositions of failed banks and the factors
that currently determine the regulators' choices, see infra text accompanying notes 113-16.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 122-29.
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cannot be made solely on the basis of disclosure about the bank's current
financial position."0
Third, market discipline must be severe enough to be felt by bank man-
agement and investors but not so severe that there is no opportunity to
respond to the market's preferences. If the consequence of any misreading
of the market is always immediate failure, market discipline is counter-
productive, resulting not in safer banks, but simply in fewer banks. Part
III explains why in the market for deposits, sudden and devastating bank
runs are the only form of discipline that is likely to occur.2 ' Although
proponents of market discipline contemplate some bank failure to serve as
a warning to other banks of the power of the market, bank runs have
precisely the opposite effect, actually discouraging both bank depositors
and management from expending any energy in the ongoing monitoring of
risk. 2
Finally, Part IV considers whether there is any way to alter these con-
ditions in the deposit market to enable market discipline to play a positive
role in controlling bank risk"3 and concludes that depositors actually will
be more attentive to their bank's financial condition if they do not have to
worry constantly about the risk of bank runs and failure.2 4 Thus, the
deposit market must be able to identify which banks will be saved in the
event of failure.' 5 Moreover, the choice of banks to be saved should be
based on specific factors relating to the financial condition of the bank that
investors can predict long in advance of failure.' 6 Since depositors will
have a reason to favor those banks whose ultimate protection is assured,
they will be more likely to be attentive to the financial condition of their
banks before actual failure is threatened.' 7
I. Depositors As Candidates to Exert Market Discipline
In theory, bank depositors appear particularly well positioned to impose
market discipline on bank management. First, unlike some industrial com-
panies that may resort to the public capital markets infrequently,' all
20. See infra text accompanying notes 117-21.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 133-44.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 142-61.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 177-82.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 183-91.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 192-93.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 194-200.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 201-08.
28. Compare Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 444
(1962) (in average corporation, most new funds come from internal capital generation, so management
is not bound to follow preferences of capital markets) with Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the
Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 410-11 (1902) (investors dissatisfied with manage-
ment will sell their shares, leading to decline in market price and change in management through
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banks must seek new deposits as an ongoing source of funds, insuring that
market discipline is constantly felt.2 Second, there is no reason to think
that depositors are insensitive to the risks associated with banks. Surveys
have revealed that depositors are increasingly aware of the financial diffi-
culties that have beset banks, 0 and publicity about banking problems and
failures will only augment this awareness. 1 Moreover, the occurrence of
bank runs demonstrates that depositors do react to perceived increases in
bank risk. 2
Nevertheless, to conclude that depositors are sensitive to bank risk (and
that banks are sensitive to the supply of deposits) is very different from
assuming that market discipline will be effective in controlling bank risk.
Proponents of market discipline as a means of reducing bank risk expect
depositors to react to increases in bank risk by requiring a risk premium
to compensate them for the additional risk associated with their deposits.3"
This in turn will have two consequences for banks with higher than aver-
age levels of risk. If the risks associated with a bank become so great that
few depositors are willing to invest even at a high rate of return, the insti-
tution will be unable to fund its risky activities. Additionally, even if some
depositors can be tempted to invest, the risk premium the bank must pay
on its deposits may exceed the return it can derive from its risky activi-
ties.3 4 In either case the bank will be forced either to reduce its risk-taking
or to risk failure.
takeover).
29. The unique importance of deposits as a funding source makes other forms of public capital
such as bank stock or debt relatively less significant, which may explain why bank securities holders
do not now exert adequate discipline on bank risk-taking.
30. A recent poll of depositors found that 58% had lost confidence in the safety and stability of
banks. See Blundell, As Basic Institutions Like Phones and Banks Change, Public Chafes, Wall St.
J., Feb. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
31. See Gross, Greater Awareness of Problems Affecting the Banking Industry Would Lower
Public Assessment of Its Health, Survey Reveals, Am. Banker, Oct. 20, 1984, at 2, col. I (respondents
who were aware of banks undergoing government bailouts and banks lending to developing countries
were twice as likely to consider banking system unhealthy as those who were unaware of these
problems).
32. Depositors have joined bank runs even when their deposits have been fully protected by
deposit insurance. See Sudo, Chinatown Run Ends, Bringing Sighs of Relief, Am. Banker, Nov. 9,
1984, at 3, col. 1.
33. See Lintner, supra note 5, at 152.
34. As the level of risk increases, the preferences of the bank and its depositors as to risk-taking
by the bank begin to diverge. For example, a bank invests all its deposits, consisting of $1000, in a
risky venture the bank expects will yield a profit of $100. If the venture actually yields $200, the
depositors will not share in the windfall but will receive only the return they negotiated with the
bank, say $75. On the other hand, if the venture fails, the bank will be indifferent as to whether it
recovers $5 or $50 of its principal investment, since all of the recovery must go to repay the depositors
a portion of their claims. Nevertheless, the size of the bank's loss will be very significant to those
depositors. See Guttentag & Herring, Credit Rationing and Financial Disorder, 39 J. FIN. 1359,
1369 (1984). Therefore, depositors may require a $100 premium before they will provide funds to
allow their bank to invest in this venture. Since the bank itself expects to earn only $100 from the
venture, it will no longer have any incentive to take the risk.
Yale Journal on Regulation
Even proponents of market discipline would admit that depositors are
not now allocating their funds in this fashion.5 Since it is plain that
depositors do care about risk, why is their concern imperfectly translated
by the market for deposits? One answer may be that risk is not always the
only factor influencing many depositors' choice of banks. The efficacy of
market discipline presupposes the presence of true investors-those who
make risk and return the most important considerations affecting their
choice among investment opportunities. If factors such as the convenient
location of bank offices, personal relationships with bank officers, or the
high cost of changing banks are more important to a depositor than risk,
they will determine that depositor's allocation of funds regardless of the
relative risks associated with different institutions. Such a depositor is not
necessarily oblivious to risk, but he cannot afford to make risk his primary
consideration in choosing a deposit relationship.
Thus, in order for market discipline to be effective, depositors must
view their bank accounts as investments, in which case risk and return are
the primary considerations in choosing a bank. Yet for most depositors, a
deposit account is less an investment than a product purchased for reasons
that have little to do with either risk or return. These "involuntary depos-
itors" are not just small unsophisticated depositors, who are now protected
by deposit insurance;86 they may be large uninsured depositors who use
their accounts for other than investment purposes. 87 Thus, the presence or
absence of deposit insurance has little to do with whether a depositor is
likely to exert market discipline.
Of course, there are bank depositors who are investors concerned prin-
cipally with the risk and return associated with their deposits. But these
investor-depositors are concentrated in the large national banks, making
market discipline a possibility only for this relatively small group of insti-
tutions.8" Moreover, ironically, the only banks that depend heavily enough
on these investor-depositors for funding to feel their clout are often al-
ready experiencing serious financial difficulty.8 9
A. The Involuntary Depositor
Suppose my employer has an arrangement with Bank A whereby its
payroll checks can be automatically deposited in its employees' checking
35. See supra note 9.
36. The insurance fund protects deposits in insured banks up to $100,000. 12 U.S.C. §
1813(m)(1) (1982). Approximately 80% of all deposits in insured banks are presently covered by
deposit insurance. 50 Fed. Reg. 19,089 (1985).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 42-43.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 49-52.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 53-56.
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accounts. I may prefer Bank B's risk posture, but because my employer
has no similar arrangement with Bank B, I maintain my checking account
with Bank A. Moreover, even if it were convenient for me to move my
business, my account may be so small that I may not be willing to spend
the money and time to acquaint myself with the relative risks associated
with all the banks in my neighborhood.
Likewise, my employer may have originally chosen Bank A for its pay-
roll account because Bank A was conveniently located. As my employer's
business has expanded, its payroll account has grown to a size that ordi-
narily would justify the cost of shopping for a less risky institution. Nev-
ertheless, it may not be willing to cause the disruption to its employees
involved in severing its present relationship.
Both my employer and I are involuntary depositors-neither of us can
afford to react to changes in the risk posture of Bank A as a true investor
would. Moreover, our failure to respond to changes in risk cannot be
explained simply by the relatively small size of our deposits. A payroll
account of half a million dollars is subject to the same risk of loss in the
event of bank failure as a negotiable certificate of deposit in the same
amount. The difference is that while the holder of the certificate of deposit
may be able to insist on adequate compensation for increased investment
risk, the payroll customer must be concerned with such non-risk-related
factors as the familiarity of bank personnel with its account or the availa-
bility of the package of services it requires.'0 More significantly, the
holder of a certificate of deposit can react to adverse changes in his bank's
financial condition by selling his investment and buying a deposit from a
healthier institution. In fact, he has an incentive to do so quickly before
the market price of his deposit instrument declines. In contrast, the pay-
roll depositor will be reluctant to begin the lengthy process of changing
banks until it is forced to act by the imminent failure of its institution.
Many involuntary depositors-those with deposit accounts under
$100,000-are currently protected from having to make decisions about
risk by the existence of deposit insurance.4'1 But deposit size is an imper-
fect indicator of a depositor's sensitivity to risk. Uninsured deposits may
be large payroll or corporate transaction accounts that are established in
order to obtain other bank services, as an alternative to holding cash in a
40. Although banks do compete for non-interest-bearing deposits by offering special bonuses or
services, the payroll customer does not view services as a form of risk premium but as a necessary part
of the product it purchases from a bank. Likewise, bonus incentives to open retail deposit ac-
counts-from lower monthly charges to toasters-hardly reflect the degree of risk associated with
different banks.
41. See supra note 36.
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vault, or for other reasons having nothing to do with investment. 2 As
these depositors are no more likely to react to changes in risk than insured
depositors, there seems little reason to expect them to exercise market
discipline."
This does not mean that involuntary depositors never respond to
increased risk. If the risks associated with a bank become so great that an
involuntary depositor faces the loss of his funds, this danger may outweigh
other considerations tying the depositor to his bank. Nevertheless, for sev-
eral reasons, the involuntary depositor's reaction is not likely to produce
the beneficial effects expected of market discipline. First, the involuntary
depositor probably will not have invested the time and money required to
monitor the financial condition of his bank. Therefore, the news that will
finally prompt a reaction from this depositor is apt to be a report of immi-
nent failure or disaster. At that point, bank management does not have the
luxury of being able to respond to market pressure, but has already failed
to solve the bank's problems.
Second, as the involuntary depositor is not familiar with bank disclos-
ure, he may not be able to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate
information.4 4 Thus, he may act on the basis of incomplete or false infor-
mation, rumors, or hysteria. Discipline may be visited on an undeserving
bank.
Finally, the involuntary depositor is likely to have a demand or short-
term deposit account that can be withdrawn with little or no advance
warning. The sudden withdrawal of a large volume of deposits in a very
short space of time itself creates a new danger for a bank unable to con-
vert its assets quickly into cash to satisfy depositors' demands.4 ' Unless the
42. Conversely, the current $100,000 ceiling on deposit insurance permits a family of four to
invest up to $400,000 in interest-bearing deposits that are fully insured, even though the family may
view their deposits as pure investments. Moreover, large depositors may obtain deposit insurance
protection by splitting their funds into $100,000 portions to be spread among several banks. Protection
of these "investors" does eliminate potential candidates for market discipline and may be an abuse of
the deposit insurance system. But see FAIC See., Inc. v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 73 (D.D.C.
1984), af'd, 753 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (requiring a literal interpretation of federal deposit
insurance statute). Nevertheless, despite the existence of these few insured "investors," the vast major-
ity of insured depositors could not exert effective market discipline even if deposit insurance coverage
were reduced or eliminated.
43. To the contrary, a strong argument can be made that, because they will never exert meaning-
ful discipline, all involuntary depositors should be protected by deposit insurance. Even some propo-
nents of market discipline have suggested that deposit insurance should cover all transaction accounts,
which would include most checking and payroll accounts. See ABA STUDY, supra note 2, at 189.
44. Although some large involuntary depositors may have the skills necessary to distinguish fact
from rumor, they will view the publicity itself as highly negative news, since it is certain to scare less
sophisticated involuntary depositors. For further consideration of the impact of the behavior of less
informed depositors on their more sophisticated brethren, see infra text accompanying notes 142-44.
45. For a discussion of this liquidity risk, see W. MELTON, INSIDE THE FED: MAKING MONE-
TARY POLICY 153-54 (1985).
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bank has an unusually large volume of liquid assets, even a small bank
run can pose a serious risk to any bank, even a healthy one."'
Thus, a core deposit run, in which small savers, corporate treasurers,
and other holders of transaction accounts rush to salvage their money
before the bank closes its doors, differs in cause and effect from ideal mar-
ket discipline. An illustration of the kind of market discipline involuntary
depositors inflict on a bank was provided by the week-long run on United
Orient Bank, a small bank located in New York City's Chinatown. The
run followed rumors that a bank officer had been identified at an
organized crime hearing as the "godfather" of Chinatown's underworld.
Despite public assurances that the rumor was false and that the bank's
financial condition was strong, five million dollars in largely insured de-
posits was withdrawn in three days. Only the bank's extraordinary liquid-
ity enabled it to weather the run without help from bank regulators. 47
B. The Investor-Depositor
Are there any depositors who realistically might be expected to exercise
effective market discipline? Such depositors must view their deposits pri-
marily as investments, so that risk and return are the primary considera-
tions guiding their investment decisions.4 Three groups of depositors
potentially fit this description. First, purchasers of large negotiable certifi-
cates of deposit, mainly financial intermediaries such as mutual funds and
pension funds, but also some individuals and corporate investors, are pri-
marily concerned with the risk and return on their funds. 9 They view
bank deposits as short-term investment alternatives to government securi-
ties, commercial paper, or other money market instruments, and they are
willing and able to shop around for the best return on their investment.
Two other groups of depositors that are sensitive primarily to risk and
return are other depository institutions that purchase funds in the in-
terbank market 0 and Eurodollar depositors, principally foreign banks and
financial institutions, that maintain deposits at foreign branches of United
States banks.61
46. See infra text accompanying notes 135-37.
47. See Sudo, supra note 32, at 3, col. 1.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
49. Large negotiable certificates of deposit (CDs) differ from insured retail certificates and other
deposit accounts in two ways. First, the rates of interest payable on negotiable CDs are competitive
with other short-term investments such as treasury bills and commercial paper; second, the holder can
sell the instrument in the secondary CD market. See W. MELTON, supra note 45, at 26.
50. Banks purchase funds from other banks in the interbank market on a daily basis to cover
changes in their reserve positions. For a description of the workings of the interbank market, see M.
SrmuM, THE MONEY MARKET 366-70 (rev. ed. 1983).
51. See id. at 34-35. Eurodollar deposits are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC).
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Although these investors in the wholesale deposit market are better can-
didates to exert market discipline than a bank's involuntary depositors, the
number of banks likely to be affected by this discipline is relatively small.
Not all banks are able or willing to rely heavily on the wholesale deposit
market for funding. First, only relatively large, nationally prominent
banks have meaningful access to the domestic and international markets
for large certificates of deposit. Approximately three-quarters of all unin-
sured deposits are concentrated in the one percent of insured commercial
banks, approximately 150 in number, with assets in excess of one billion
dollars.5"
Second, wholesale deposits are both more expensive than retail deposits,
as banks must pay market rates of interest in order to compete for funds,
and more volatile, as the average wholesale depositor is willing and able
to liquidate its investment quickly should changes occur in the issuer's
financial position or reputation.5" A corporate treasurer purchasing a
large certificate of deposit as a short-term investment for excess cash will
not feel constrained to choose a particular bank because of prior business
relationships or convenience but will simply choose the institution offering
the best return. Likewise, the treasurer will have no inclination to leave
his funds in an institution experiencing financial difficulties because of his
loyalty to the institution or concern about the effect of the bank's failure
on the local community.
For these reasons, wholesale deposits on balance are a less desirable
source of funding than retail deposits. Thus, even large banks prefer not
to rely too heavily on wholesale deposits, lessening the potential impact of
discipline by these depositors. Ironically, the banks that are forced to
depend substantially on wholesale deposits are those that are already ex-
periencing funding difficulties in their core deposit market.5 4 Moreover,
unusually heavy reliance on wholesale deposits is itself perceived by the
market as additional negative information about the bank.5" Therefore,
52. See Gilbert, Disclosure and Market Discipline: Issues and Evidence, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF A-r.ANrA EcON. REV., Nov. 1983, at 70. In general, bank deposits are highly concentrated, with
26 cents of every dollar of deposits held by the 25 largest deposit-taking institutions. Cacace, 25
Institutions Hold 25% Deposits, Am. Banker, Apr. 9, 1984, at I, col. 3.
53. This, of course, is exactly what proponents of market discipline would expect. See supra text
accompanying notes 33-34.
54. For example, for almost a decade prior to the federal bailout, 70% of Continental Illinois'
total liabilities consisted of wholesale deposits. Inquiry into Continental Illinois Corp. and Continen-
tal Illinois National Bank: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision,
Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 236 (1984) [hereinafter Continental Hearings] (Statement of C.T. Conover, Comp-
troller of the Currency). At first, Continental was forced to rely on purchased funds because of the
unavailability of sufficient retail deposits in its home market; later on, the bank had difficulty at-
tracting any funds. See infra note 56.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 109-10.
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the banks that are most likely to be affected by the market discipline of
investor-depositors are those that are already subject to increased funding
risks that may reflect other more serious problems. For these banks, mar-
ket discipline may come too late.56
II. Depositors' Access to Information About Bank Risk
The previous Part has demonstrated that only a few depositors at a
small group of banks are likely candidates for market discipline. But even
having depositors who are willing and able to exert market discipline is
not enough to insure its success. In order for market discipline to work,
depositors also must have access to adequate information about their bank
to make accurate determinations concerning risk.
Most proponents of market discipline regard the lack of information
about banks as the major stumbling block to effective discipline today.5" It
has been generally assumed that the operations of banks, unlike other
firms, are protected from public scrutiny by a veil of secrecy created by
statutory design,58 supported by the regulators, and jealously guarded by
the industry.59 As evidence of this tradition of secrecy, critics point to the
puzzling exemption of banks from various parts of the federal securities
laws"' and the seeming lack of candor of bank regulators concerning their
56. Continental Illinois is a prime example. When the bank's serious asset problems became front
page news, the wholesale depositors who earlier had been happy to earn the high returns Continental
was forced to offer fled from the bank en masse. See infra text accompanying note 108. Perhaps bank
management should view any increase in the bank's dependence on wholesale deposits as a warning
signal that it must take steps to reduce its risk-taking. Yet even Continental's dependence on wholesale
deposits at first was due to its rapid growth beyond the funding capacity of its local market, a
phenomenon that may be experienced by sound banks that effectively manage their increased cost of
funding. In any case, market discipline presupposes that the depositors must exercise the restraint,
since bank management will go on taking risks so long as it can profitably fund its risky ventures. See
infra text accompanying notes 150-61.
57. See Comptroller Statement, supra note 2; Murphy, supra note 7, at 86-87.
58. For a discussion of the legal basis for confidentiality in bank regulation, see Mathewson,
supra note 6, at 146-50.
59. See, e.g., Kane, Foreword to J. SINKEY, PROBLEM AND FAILED INSTITUTIONS IN THE COM-
MERCIAL BANKING INDusrIRY at xxi (1979) (criticizing bank financial disclosures as "exercises in
cosmetic accounting").
60. Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982), exempts from
registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) new issues of securities by banks
supervised by federal or state authorities. The sketchy legislative history of the exemption suggests
that it was motivated not by any desire to insulate banks from disclosure but by the assumption that
disclosure requirements would be included in the federal banking legislation that was simultaneously
under consideration by Congress. Butera, Bank Exemption From the Securities Act, 93 BANKING L.J.
432, 447 (1976). But cf. Note, SEC Regulation of American Depositary Receipts: Disclosure, Ltd., 65
YALE L.J. 861, 870 n.49 (1956) (speculating that the exemption was designed to prevent bank runs
produced by negative disclosure). Although banks were not originally exempted from the periodic
disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), the SEC by rule
created a temporary exemption for bank securities until a special form, never actually adopted, could
be developed. I Fed. Reg. 2117 (1936) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.12a-l (1964), repealed 1982, 47
Fed. Reg. 29,651). After finding that bank disclosure fell short of the SEC's standards, see SEC,
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assistance to or disposition of failing institutions."'
Therefore, proponents of market discipline have urged both expansion
and improvement of public disclosure by and about banking organiza-
tions. 2 Although they admit that additional revelations about the dark
underside of banking may lead to diminished confidence in banks and
even more bank runs in the short term, they counter that more reliable
information will prevent the market 'from acting on the basis of rumors
and half-truths." Moreover, the long-term effect of disclosure will be to
deter banks from taking risks that may require negative disclosure. 4
The recent calls for more bank disclosure ignore the fact that informa-
tion about the operations and financial condition of banks, particularly
large institutions, already is surprisingly comprehensive, readily available,
and, in the view of the professional analysts who use it, equal to or better
than disclosure currently available about other industries.65 Most impor-
tant, this public disclosure provides all the information necessary for de-
positors to make accurate judgments as to the financial risks associated
with their banks."' If investors in bank deposits0 7 do not make use of this
information, it is not because the information is inaccessible or
inadequate.
Rather, depositors may not use such information because it is
REPoRT OF SPE.CIA. S'ruDv OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doex. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
35-39 (1963), Congress in 1964 explicitly subjected banks to the periodic disclosure requirements of
the Exchange Act, although administration was left to the federal bank regulators. In 1974, Congress
required the regulators to adopt disclosure rules and regulations substantially similar to those of the
SEC. See Exchange Act § 12(i), 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1982). For a discussion of the history of § 12(i),
see L. Loss, FUNDAMENTAIS OF SECURtrFES REGULATION 469-71 (1983).
61. See Evans, Disclosure Through a Glass Darkly, 27 AD. L. REV. 357, 359 (1975) (SEC in-
sisted, over objections of bank regulators, on disclosure of problems at U.S. National Bank and Frank-
lin National Bank); SEC v. Youmans, 543 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (securities law require-
ment to disclose material adverse changes included terms of written agreement between failing bank
and its regulator). Whatever their earlier attitude, the bank regulators recently have required timely
disclosure of certain problems experienced by banks, including supervisory agreements and
enforcement actions. See Garsson & Trigaux, Comptroller Steps Up Pressure on Big Bank Capital
Adequacy, Am. Banker, Nov. 19, 1984, at 17, col. 1 (disclosure of formal agreements between Comp-
troller of the Currency and Bank of America and First Chicago to increase capital and correct
irregularities).
62. See supra note 2.
63. See Mathewson, supra note 6, at 176.
64. See id. at 164-65.
65. See, e.g., Coulson, Full Disclosure: The SEC's Requirements Relating to Bank Holding Com-
panies, FED. RESERvE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., Nov. 1983, at 62, 69 (SEC accountant
asserts that bank holding company disclosure is more comprehensive and sophisticated than that of
most industries); Wooden & Paluszek, Disclosure Needs of Financial Analysts: Large Bank Holding
Companies, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA E.ON. REV., Nov. 1983, at 77, 79 (bank analysts
note recent improvement in quality and uniformity of information).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 84-95.
67. As only investor-depositors can be expected to make effective use of ongoing information about
bank risk, see supra text accompanying notes 39-43, only they shall be considered in this discussion of
bank disclosure.
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incomplete in one important respect. Although public disclosure is helpful
in assessing the financial risks associated with investments in banks as
going concerns, it is of no help in evaluating the risks associated with
investments in banks once they have failed. After a bank has failed, the
fate of its depositors is entirely subject to the discretion of the bank regula-
tors, who have the option either to liquidate the bank or to keep it alive
with federal financial assistance. Ironically, depending on the regulators'
choice as to the appropriate handling of a, failed bank, the bank's deposi-
tors may either lose all or part of their investments or be guaranteed com-
plete protection.68 In view of the vastly different consequences for the
bank's depositors, the probable regulatory disposition of a bank upon fail-
ure is understandably a very significant element of a depositor's assess-
ment of the risks associated with his investment. Yet, as will be demon-
strated,69 bank financial disclosure is not very helpful in assisting
depositors to predict which of these two possibilities will occur.
A. Assessing Financial Risk
1. Mandatory Disclosure
The principal sources of continuous information about bank financial
condition, particularly for large publicly held institutions, 70 are the reports
prepared by banks pursuant to the patchwork of mandatory disclosure
requirements imposed by the securities and banking laws."' Although
most of this disclosure is directed to investors in bank securities, the finan-
cial information it contains is equally useful to depositors in assessing the
risks associated with their banks. 72 Moreover, the recent development of
68. For a description of the regulatory alternatives, see infra text accompanying notes 113-16.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 116-21.
70. As of 1983, approximately 18% of insured banks were owned by public bank holding compa-
nies and an additional 5% were themselves publicly held. See FEDERAL. DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPO-
RATION, DEPosrr INSURANCE IN A CHANGIN; ENVIRONMENr C-10, C-I1 (April 15, 1983). Dis-
closure by smaller privately held banks, particularly those not subject to federal bank regulation, is
less comprehensive. Nevertheless, these banks attract so few wholesale deposits that there is little need
for additional disclosure.
71. This disclosure includes periodic disclosure by publicly held bank holding companies and
banks under the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (annual, quarterly and special reports), § 78n(a)
(proxy statements), and § 78n(d) (tender offer statements) (1982); year-end consolidated reports of
income and quarterly consolidated reports of condition submitted by all federally regulated banks
under the banking laws, 12 U.S.C. § 161 (national banks), § 324 (state member banks), and § 1817
(insured banks) (1982); and special disclosure under the banking laws concerning areas of particular
supervisory concern, such as insider loans, 12 C.F.R. § 304.4 (1986), and foreign loan concentrations,
12 U.S.C.A. § 3906 (West Supp. 1984).
72. Criticism of current mandatory disclosure generally focuses on discrepancies between format
and presentation of financial statements prepared for the SEC and for the bank regulators; the latter
are prepared in accordance with certain regulatory accounting standards that vary from generally
accepted accounting principles. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, General In-
structions for the Preparation of Call Reports, 5 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 60,980A, at 38,928
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professional analysis and private sector rating firms which translate avail-
able data into the form that is most useful to depositors' needs provides an
efficient method of disseminating information to depositors. 73
Banks also have an incentive to supplement mandatory disclosure vol-
untarily in order to improve their competitive positions, particularly in
areas such as foreign lending where publicity about banks generally has
been negative. For example, a bank with significant foreign loans may
choose to disclose more details about its portfolio than is required by dis-
closure rules in order to show that its foreign loans are relatively short-
term or otherwise less risky than those of its competitors.7 ' If other banks
are thereby forced to make similar disclosures in order to reassure the
market that their foreign exposure also is not significantly worse than
average, the quality of industry disclosure is improved.7" Although some
firms may ignore industry practice and simply comply with the minimum
mandatory disclosure standards, they risk creating the impression that
they have something to hide.
A possible objection to the adequacy of current mandatory disclosure
concerns its accessibility to all depositors. Depositors whose accounts are
relatively small may not seek out information on their own or hire expen-
sive bank analysts because the cost of obtaining information exceeds any
possible benefit they will derive from the additional knowledge. Yet, as
suggested above," most small depositors do not view their deposit accounts
as investments and would not use financial information even if it were
available to them at no cost. Moreover, so long as some large investors are
willing to pay for the best available information, that information should
be reflected rapidly in the price structure for deposits when those deposi-
tors insist on adequate risk premiums from their banks.77
(Nov. 14, 1983). As most large banks are subject to both requirements, however, investors are able to
obtain comparable data concerning different banks.
73. See, e.g., Cates, Disciplined Bank Management Can Turn Risk to Its Advantage, Am.
Banker, Nov. 20, 1984, at 4, col. 1 (growing market for private sector bank credit rating and
analysis).
74. At present, banks are required to disclose only the aggregate level of foreign outstandings by
country and in some cases by category of borrower. See generally Coombe & Lapic, Problem Loans,
Foreign Outstandings, and Other Developments in Bank Disclosure, 40 Bus. LAW. 485, 496 (1985).
75. See Benston, Required Periodic Disclosure Under the Securities Acts and the Proposed Fed-
eral Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1471, 1473 (1979) (firms have incentives to disclose
information voluntarily up to the point where marginal benefits to investors equal or exceed costs of
producing and disseminating information). Mandatory disclosure requirements are still necessary to
insure that the industry as a whole produces information in a form that is sufficiently intelligible and
standardized to permit comparative judgments. See Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case
for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 722 (1984).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 39-47.
77. Cf Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 569-72
(1984) (subgroups of informed traders can cause stock prices to reflect information by trading at
premium over "uninformed" price levels).
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This process may work less efficiently to the extent that the market for
deposits is fragmented into a number of submarkets populated by different
groups of investors that rarely overlap. For example, the market for small
retail deposits is unlikely to reflect informed trading in the separate mar-
ket for negotiable certificates of deposit.78 Nevertheless, depositors will be
sensitive to strong signals given by other submarkets. Thus, if a bank sud-
denly offers above-market )premiums to attract large deposits, all
depositors who hear this information may suspect that the institution is
experiencing some financial difficulty. Likewise, a deposit run by involun-
tary depositors will immediately affect the behavior of investors in the
wholesale deposit market.7 9 Information, particularly negative informa-
tion, can be disseminated extremely quickly in the deposit market.
2. The Significance of Regulator Data
Despite the availability of information about bank financial condition
that is comparable to that available about other companies, market disci-
pline will still not be possible if some additional data essential to an accu-
rate assessment of risk are consistently withheld from the market. The
information collected by bank regulators during bank examinations,80 as
well as their internal assessments of the health of examined institutions,"'
are not revealed to investors.82 If this information is required for deposi-
tors to make informed investment decisions, its unavailability may explain
the failure of depositors adequately to discipline banks. That one of the
major justifications for withholding such data from the market is the regu-
lators' fear that depositors will overreact to a negative assessment83 sug-
gests the potential significance of regulator data to the deposit market.
Nevertheless, the fact that depositors would consider the regulators'
views significant does not mean that such data are essential to judge the
financial condition of a bank. Despite the regulators' relatively greater
78. For a description of the different characteristics of these two kinds of deposits, see supra note
49.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 142-43.
80. Regulators rely on periodic on-site examinations to identify areas of concern that, if uncor-
rected, could lead to future problems. 12 U.S.C. §§ 325, 481, 1820(b) (1982).
81. Following the examination, a report is prepared summarizing the examiner's findings and
making recommendations for corrective action. The bank is assigned a rating pursuant to an internal
numerical rating system for financial condition (CAMEL) and the bank may be placed on an internal
problem bank list. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Uniform Financial Rat-
ing System, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,110 (Nov. 21, 1979).
82. See, e.g., First State Bank of Hudson County v. United States, 599 F.2d 558, 563 (3d Cir.
1979) (as examinations are intended to prevent losses resulting in claims against insurance fund and
not to "ring the alarm bell to arouse drowsy directors and misguided shareholders," regulators had no
duty to disclose irregularities discovered during examination).
83. See Consumers Union v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming exemption
of examination reports from disclosure under Freedom of Information Act on this basis).
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access to information about bank condition, their record in predicting
which banks will experience financial difficulty has been no better than
that of the market on the basis of public information. 4 Although
mandatory disclosure by banks may not assist investors in discovering
insider fraud, illegality, or other forms of misconduct which are responsi-
ble for a large percentage of bank failures, 85 even the regulators have been
unsuccessful in uncovering such abuses before they caused serious finan-
cial problems.86 Moreover, despite the regulators' policy of confidentiality,
the market is adept at finding clues to their assessment of individual banks
in regulatory actions on routine administrative matters such as applica-
tions for new offices or activities.8 7
An opportunity to measure the importance the market for bank stocks
attaches to regulators' internal assessments of individual banks arose in
early 1976, when two problem bank lists were leaked to the press. 8 A
study of stock price movements of banks on the lists found that the stocks
experienced only a temporary decline in price following disclosure of the
lists, and no spillover effect was observed among bank stocks generally.89
Moreover, market perception of the risk characteristics of the problem
group was unaffected."' A second study found no significant market
84. A study comparing the relative accuracy of three bank failure prediction models, one using
only publicly available data and the other two incorporating variables based on examiners' confiden-
tial classifications, concluded that the usefulness of examination data in predicting failure declined
relative to public data as the interval between the date of the information and the year of failure
increased. Bovenzi, Marino & McFadden, Commercial Bank Failure Prediction Models, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF ATI.ANTA ECON. REv., Nov. 1983, at 14. See also J. SINKEY, supra note 59, at
185 (early warning system relying exclusively on public data could have predicted problems at Frank-
lin National Bank as early as two years prior to failure).
85. See HousE CoMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, FEDERAL RESPONSE ro, CRIMINAL
MISCONDUCT AND INSIDER ABUSE IN THE NATION'S FINANCIAL INSTrUTIONS, H.R. REP. No.
1137, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1984) (undetected criminal misconduct by insiders may have been major
contributing factor in at least 45% of 75 commercial bank failures between January 1980 and June
1983).
86. Id. Professional analysts may actually be better than bank regulators at evaluating risk be-
cause of the greater capacity of the private sector to fund sophisticated analytic techniques. See Cates,
supra note 73, at 4, col. 4 (superiority of private sector bank analysis).
87. For example, although the Comptroller did not disclose that as a result of its examination of
Franklin National Bank in early 1974 it had recommended a one billion dollar retrenchment pro-
gram, the subsequent denial by the Federal Reserve Board of an application by Franklin's holding
company to acquire a nonbank subsidiary on the ground that such an acquisition would interfere with
the company's efforts to improve Franklin's internal structure and asset composition was viewed by
the market as a sign of the regulators' concerns about Franklin's viability and triggered the first
serious deposit run. See J. SINKEY, supra note 59, at 148.
88. On January 11, 1976, the names of two banks on the Comptroller's problem bank list were
leaked to the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times. On January 22, a Federal Reserve Board
list of 35 troubled bank holding companies was obtained by the New York Times. See Murphy, Dis-
closure of the Problem Bank Lists: A Test of the Impact, 10 J. BANK RES., Summer 1979, at 88, 89.
89. Id. at 92.
90. Id. at 95.
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reaction tp the disclosure. 91 The results suggest that the stock market may
already have been aware of the problems that led to the banks' inclusion
on the lists.9"
Another study of stock price movements of twenty-five bank holding
companies whose subsidiary banks experienced a major change in finan-
cial condition found that the stock prices began to decline an average of
fifteen months before the regulators recognized the problems and lowered
their internal ratings9" of the banks. 4 These studies suggest that the mar-
ket for bank stocks is using publicly available information to make accu-
rate judgments about bank risk. Since investors in bank deposits rely on
exactly the same information,"8 they should in theory be equally
successful.
3. Using Size As a Proxy for Risk
If public information about bank financial condition is good enough to
enable the deposit market to be even better than the regulators at predict-
ing which banks are likely to experience financial difficulty, why is it that
market discipline is not already felt, at least by those banks that purchase
wholesale deposits? We would expect investors to demand risk premiums
on deposits in banks whose financial condition is risky, and to avoid banks
on the brink of financial disaster. Bank management would then be forced
to respond to changes in the demand for its deposits, reducing its risk-
taking in order to lower its cost of funding.
In fact, there is evidence in the wholesale deposit market that this pro-
cess does occur to some extent. Large depositors demand higher rates
before investing in certain banks. Apart from instances when as a result of
unusual adverse publicity particular banks have been penalized by the
market, 6 however, the differentials in rates paid on comparable deposits
appear to reflect size rather than the actual degree of risk associated with
individual institutions. For example, an analysis of the rates quoted by
major dealers for short-term certificates of deposit offered by twenty-four
banks revealed that the seven largest institutions (by total deposits) paid
approximately the same rate for funds, while smaller banks consistently
91. Johnson & Weber, The Impact of the Problem Bank Disclosure on Bank Share Prices, 8 J.
BANK Rits., Autumn 1977, at 179-80.
92. See id. at 182 (disclosure of lists viewed as irrelevant or redundant).
93. See supra note 81.
94. See Schick & Sherman, Bank Stock Prices as an Early Warning System for Changes in
Condition, 11 J. BANK REs., Autumn 1980, at 136-46.
95. See supra text accompanying note 72.
96. For example, for a four month period after the failure of Penn Square Bank, the wholesale
CD market penalized Continental Illinois, which was identified as a major purchaser of loan partici-
pations from Penn Square. See Gilbert, supra note 52, at 72.
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paid a premium over the large bank rate.97 Moreover, deposit size was a
more important variable affecting rates than traditional risk measures,
such as earnings variability and debt-equity ratios, that determine rate
spreads in the corporate bond market."
One explanation frequently given for the deposit market's bias in favor
of large banks is that it reflects the widely held perception that some
banks are too big to fail. When a large bank becomes insolvent, the
potential cost to the insurance fund to reimburse its insured depositors is
so high" that the regulators are virtually forced to arrange a merger or
even to provide direct financial assistance to keep the bank solvent until a
permanent solution can be found. 00 To date, only one bank (Penn Square
Bank) with assets in excess of $100 million has been liquidated.0 1 The
giant Continental Illinois, at the time the nation's seventh largest bank,
was not closed despite the inability of the regulators to find an acceptable
merger partner.102 Thus, the larger the bank, the less likely it appears
that even uninsured depositors will experience any losses in the event of
failure.1 03
If this perception is accurate, holding an uninsured deposit in a large
bank is a relatively safe gamble. There is no need for depositors to spend
time analyzing bank financial data if the solvency of certain banks is vir-
tually guaranteed by the government. Depositors can simply limit their
investments to the fifty or so banks that are too big to fail. 04
Although the belief that some banks are too big to fail is frequently
voiced by the press and by small banks,"' it is very doubtful whether any
participant in the wholesale deposit market would dare to bet on it with
his own or his clients' funds. Recent experiences with several large fail-
ures or near-failures have demonstrated that the larger a bank becomes,
97. See Crane, A Study of Interest Rate Spreads in the 1974 CD Market, 5 J. BANK RFs.,
Autumn 1974, at 213-17.
98. Id. at 223.
99. At the end of 1983, total deposits of 13 banks insured by the FDIC exceeded the size of the
insurance fund. WORKING GROUP OF THE CABINET COUNCIl. ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, R.C;OMMEN-
DATIONS FOR CHAN(;E IN THE FEDERAl. DFPOsIT INSURANCF SYSTEM 20 (1985).
100. For a discussion of the regulators' options in handling a failed bank, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 113-16.
101. Gilbert, supra note 52, at 70.
102. Morris & Weiner, U.S. Rescues Continental Illinois Corp., Am. Banker, May 18, 1984, at
1, col. 2 (S7.3 billion bailout).
103. See Trigaux, Isaac, in a Shift, Warns Convention on Nationalization, Am. Banker, Oct.
23, 1984, at 3, col. 1 (FDIC Chairman accused large banks of having become "addicted" to defacto
100% deposit insurance).
104. See Gilbert, supra note 52, at 71 (institutional investors use size and performance criteria
that effectively limit their investments to the 50 largest banks).
105. See, e.g., Ringer & Albert, Small Banks Complain of Double Standard, Am. Banker, May
21, 1984, at 30, col. 1 (large multinational banks will not be allowed to fail even when a merger
cannot be arranged).
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the more difficult it is for the regulators either to find another bank that
can afford to buy it or to justify the amount of direct assistance required
to keep the bank alive."" Sooner or later, a bank will fail that is so large
that liquidation may be inevitable."0 7 Moreover, even if a merger
ultimately can be arranged for a large bank, prolonged uncertainty sur-
rounding the fate of the bank will disrupt the secondary trading market
for its wholesale deposits. Uninsured depositors concerned about the li-
quidity of their investments cannot afford to wait months for the regula-
tors to find a merger partner.
Ironically, the very example that usually is cited as evidence that some
banks are too big to fail actually provides the proof that investors in bank
deposits do not rely on this assumption. Even after all three federal bank
regulators announced that all depositors and other creditors in Continen-
tal Illinois would be protected in full,'0 8 wholesale depositors, principally
foreign banks, continued to withdraw their funds. These depositors appar-
ently were not even sure that the regulators could honor an explicit guar-
antee. Thus, depositors are unlikely to rely simply on the past record of
the regulators in successfully arranging mergers.
Why then does the deposit market favor large banks? The preference
may simply reflect the generally accurate assumption that large banks are
on the whole safer than smaller banks. Large banks issue more certificates
of deposit than smaller banks, so the secondary trading market in their
instruments is more active. The largest banks, which tend to be located in
high population areas, also usually have access to a large and stable cus-
tomer base of involuntary depositors,' 0 9 making their relative dependence
on wholesale deposits actually less than that of smaller banks with fewer
core deposits."' For these reasons, size may be a logical and fairly accu-
rate proxy for bank risk. Therefore, as investors apparently do discrimi-
nate among banks on the basis of risk, we return to our original question:
106. For example, when Franklin National Bank, the nation's twentieth largest bank, failed, the
only potential merger partners were foreign banks and California's Bank of America, which was
precluded from acquiring a New York bank under existing state and federal banking laws. Franklin's
ultimate sale to European-American Bank and Trust Company followed five months of negotiations,
during which the bank was kept solvent by large loans from the Federal Reserve Bank, and ultimately
required shrinking the bank to a digestible size. See Barr, The Last Days of Franklin National Bank,
27 A. L. REv. 301, 311 (1975).
107. This was the case on a smaller scale in the Penn Square Bank failure, when no buyer could
be found for the bank at an acceptable price. See supra text accompanying note 101.
108. Comprehensive Financial Assistance Program Set for Continental Illinois National Bank,
[1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 99,972 (May 17, 1984).
109. This is not true of all money center banks. For example, restrictive branching statutes in
Illinois impeded Continental Illinois' ability to establish a broad base of retail deposit customers. See
Continental Hearings, supra note 54, at 206.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
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Why is it that market discipline is not already working to affect bank
behavior?
B. Assessing Liquidation Risk
1. Measuring Liquidation Risk
Disclosure about bank financial condition is reliable, accessible, and
widely used by bank investors who will demand a risk premium for
investing in certain banks. Nevertheless, a depositor's assessment of the
risks associated with individual investments may still be incomplete. As-
sume that an investor is choosing between two institutions offering
$200,000 certificates of deposit with identical terms and rates of interest.
Based on his analysis of public financial data, the investor predicts that
Bank A has a twenty percent chance of failure while Bank B's chances
are eighty percent. The investor therefore buys a certificate of deposit
from Bank A. Six months later, both banks fail. Bank A is liquidated, and
our depositor loses the uninsured portion of his investment.111 In contrast,
Bank B is purchased by Bank C, which assumes all of Bank B's deposit
liabilities. 1 As a result, Bank B's depositors, who were less prudent
investors, experience no losses.
No additional information about Bank A's financial condition would
have assisted our investor in predicting his risk of loss more accurately.
Moreover, at the time he made his investment, even the regulators did not
know which institution would be liquidated and which merged. Although
the regulators will attempt to arrange an assumption of a failed bank's
deposits by a healthy institution whenever the cost to the insurance fund
will thereby be less than the cost of paying off all insured depositors,11
this choice depends on the willingness of a healthy bank to acquire the
failed institution at an acceptable price. Although Bank C may be willing
to pay a premium to obtain Bank B's valuable assets and deposits, it will
11. When a bank is liquidated, insured depositors are generally reimbursed out of the insurance
fund within live to seven days. Uninsured depositors are treated as unsecured creditors who share in
the proceeds of the liquidation pro rata with other general creditors, including the insurance fund,
which is subrogated to the claims of the insured depositors. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g) (1982). In the past,
uninsured depositors ultimately have recovered most or all of their investment in the liquidation pro-
ceedings. As of the end of 1983, 99.1% of all depositors were reimbursed in full. FDIC ANN. REP.
1983 at 14. Nevertheless, depositors have lost post-failure interest and the use of their funds for long
periods.
112. Bank C cannot pick and choose among Bank B's deposits. As the sale of a closed bank
involves a distribution of receivership assets to the acquiring bank, provisions for pro rata treatment of
creditors under national and many state laws governing bank liquidations require the purchaser to
assume all liabilities on an equal basis. See First Empire Bank v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 572 F.2d
1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978).
113. See FDIC ANN. Ri.:P. 1974 at 3.
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still require financial assistance from the insurance fund,114 as well as
indemnification against contingent liabilities,"' before it will assume
Bank B's liabilities. If this financial assistance had exceeded the cost of
reimbursing Bank B's insured depositors and liquidating its assets, the
regulators would not have been able to arrange the merger. 6
How then can depositors assess liquidation risk? Some of the currently
available financial information about bank condition may provide deposi-
tors with a few guideposts. Thus, a failed bank is more likely to be an
attractive candidate for acquisition if it has a large inventory of perform-
ing loans or valuable securities, a strong core deposit base, an attractive
location, or other qualities for which bidding firms are willing to pay a
premium. Conversely, failed banks with poor asset quality or large contin-
gent liabilities are less likely to attract bidders, resulting in a long period
of protracted negotiation before a merger can be arranged or, as a last
resort, a deposit payoff.
Moreover, the value of the failed bank's assets will in part determine
whether a merger is a feasible solution from the point of view of the regu-
lators, since the more a purchaser is willing to pay for those assets, the
less federal financial assistance will be needed to arrange a merger.1 7
Nevertheless, the regulators' ability to arrange a merger ultimately
depends on the amount and composition of the failed bank's deposits at
the time of failure. The more deposits the purchaser must assume in the
merger, the more financial assistance will be necessary, which must be
offset against the premium the purchaser is willing to pay for the bank's
assets." 8 The required assistance must also be less than the value of the
bank's insured deposits, which the regulators would otherwise have to
reimburse out of the insurance fund. Thus, application of the current
114. The amount of federal assistance required to arrange the merger of a failed bank, FA, equals
the amount of assumed liabilities, AL, less any clean assets, CA, less the premium (if any) that the
acquiring firm is willing to pay for the failed bank's franchise, P: FA = AL - CA - P. See J. SINKEY,
supra note 59, at 36-37. In other words, the lower the quality of the failed bank's valuable attributes,
such as performing loans, stable sources of deposits or other factors for which an acquiring bank will
pay a premium, the more federal financial assistance will be required to arrange a merger, increasing
the likelihood that liquidation and payoff of insured depositors will be the cheaper alternative.
115. See Penn Square Bank Failure: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, Part 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1982) (Statement of FDIC Chairman Isaac)
(possibility of large contingent claims requiring indemnification of a purchaser by FDIC made merger
of Penn Square Bank unfeasible).
116. Alternatively, the regulators may provide direct financial assistance to prevent a failing bank
from closing, to reopen a closed bank, or to prevent extraordinary risk to the insurance fund. 12
U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1) (1982). In order to provide such assistance, however, the regulators must find
that such assistance is the least costly alternative or that keeping the bank open is essential to provide
adequate banking services to the community. 12 U.S.C § 1823(c)(4) (1982). This authority was relied
upon to provide capital assistance to Continental Illinois in lieu of a liquidation or merger.
117. See supra note 114.
118. See supra note 114.
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regulatory formula may require different dispositions of banks with very
similar asset values. 119
Further, the attractiveness of a failed bank as an acquisition for other
banks may not always reflect its asset value. The desire to evade interstate
banking restrictions often may be a more important motive for some bids
than the intrinsic worth of a failed bank.1 20 Conversely, the post-failure
acquisition market may undervalue a failed bank with valuable assets if it
happens to be located in a state that is already open to out-of-state
banks. " Thus, extraneous and unpredictable factors currently enter the
bidding process, making prediction of the outcome virtually impossible for
either depositors or the regulators.
2. Avoiding Liquidation Risk
The previous discussion has demonstrated that, from the point of view
of the depositor, evaluation of the risks associated with an investment in a
bank involves an assessment not only of the probability that the firm will
encounter serious financial difficulty but also of the likely fate of the insti-
tution should these problems cause it to fail. Yet, if this latter assessment
will inevitably be inexact, how then can depositors protect themselves
from the uncertainty of liquidation risk?
Of course, if a bank never fails, its ultimate regulatory disposition is
irrelevant. Depositors could shield themselves from the uncertainty created
by liquidation risk by choosing conservative institutions that do not pose a
risk of failure. Moreover, even if a failed bank is saved, depositors may
still pay some price, such as the interrupted liquidity of their investments
or lost interest.1 22 So why don't depositors simply select safe banks that
will not fail?
One problem is that today there are no "safe" banks that are guaran-
teed never to suffer a financial crisis that may lead to failure. Few ana-
lysts anticipated the widespread failures and problems that have beset the
agricultural banks of the Midwest when several years ago these banks
119. A simple illustration will suffice, using the equation set forth in note 114 supra. Assume that
Bank A and Bank B each have identical assets, valued at $10, and command an identical acquisition
premium of $2. Bank A has deposit liabilities of $20, of which $5 are insured. Bank B has deposit
liabilities of $21, of which $10 are insured. In the case of Bank A, liquidation will be less costly than
a federally assisted merger, since total liabilities ($20) less assets ($10) less premium ($2) equals $8 of
required federal assistance, which is more than the cost of paying off Bank A's insured depositors. In
the case of Bank B, liabilities ($21) less assets ($10) less premium ($2) equals $9 of required federal
assistance, more than is required for Bank A, yet less than the cost of reimbursing Bank B's insured
depositors. Thus, a merger is the less costly alternative for Bank B.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 155-58.
121. Recently, the popularity of other methods of obtaining a foothold in another state has less-
ened the attractiveness of all failed banks to potential buyers. See infra text accompanying note 160.
122. These costs however will not be as severe as in the event of liquidation. See supra note 111.
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appeared to be making safe and profitable loans.' Although in hindsight
these banks may be faulted for making too many loans to a single industry
or area,12' most banks are affected by changes in the economic conditions
of their region. Moreover, all banks are vulnerable to unpredictable risks
such as fluctuating interest rates and unexpected demands for liquidity.' 5
Ironically, banks have discovered that attempts to shield themselves from
these risks by maintaining very conservative or liquid portfolios may
themselves be counterproductive, simply reducing bank earnings and
thereby discouraging depositors.126
Thus, although there are banks that clearly can be labelled riskier than
average, a completely safe bank is hard to find. Moreover, even if deposi-
tors at least try to avoid banks on the brink of failure, they may have
trouble deciding when an institution is considered to be failing. Bank reg-
ulators have considerable discretion to determine when a receiver should
be appointed in order to protect creditors even if, technically, the bank's
liabilities do not yet exceed its assets.'" Alternatively, a failing bank may
be kept open through federal lending and other assistance for as long as
the regulators deem necessary to permit an orderly disposition.' 28
Present regulatory treatment of failed banks also gives depositors more
reason to try to predict liquidation risk than to try to predict bank failure.
Under existing law, when a bank fails, the regulators have no
intermediate step between preserving the bank as a going concern through
merger or direct financial assistance, in which case all depositors are pro-
tected in full, and liquidating the bank, in which case only insured deposi-
tors are guaranteed full recovery. When an investor must choose between
two banks with comparable levels of risk, this difference in possible out-
comes in the event of failure becomes very significant. Thus, the investor
will not incur substantial additional expense to determine which bank is
marginally more likely to fail, but will be more interested in fathoming
123. See Bennett, Farm Banks Anguished by Fall from Pedestal, Am. Banker, Feb. 4, 1985, at 1,
col. 2 (reporting that 10 out of 27 bank failures between June and September of 1984 involved agri-
cultural banks).
124. See Regulator Says Many Failed Farm Banks Have Themselves to Blame For Results of
Mismanagement, Insider Abuse, Am. Banker, Mar. 26, 1985, at 3, col. 1 (FDIC study of farm bank
failures concluded that none had been due to adverse economic conditions alone; in many cases mis-
management was primary cause).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
126. For further discussion of this problem, see infra text accompanying notes 147-49.
Theoretically, the safest bank would have a portfolio consisting exclusively of cash, but it would still
be vulnerable to theft and inflation, and would be unable to pay depositors a return on their funds.
127. United States Say. Bank v. Morgenthau, 85 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
605 (1936); In re Franklin Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
128. Although Franklin National Bank might have been declared insolvent and closed any time
after May 1974, it was kept open by loans from the Federal Reserve Bank in order to give the
regulators time to arrange a federally assisted merger. See J. SINKEY, supra note 59, at 154-58.
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which one will be saved. The greater the risks associated with both banks,
and hence the greater the chance of failure, the more important assessing
liquidation risk will become.
Thus, to investors in bank deposits, liquidation risk is as significant as,
and in some cases more significant than, the current financial condition of
their banks. Nevertheless, it seems highly unlikely that depositors are so
busy trying to guess the fates of their banks in the event of failure that
they completely ignore present financial condition. Hence, it is puzzling
why market discipline apparently has so little effect on the deposit mar-
ket. Perhaps depositors do not worry about liquidation risk after all but
assume that the odds are that their bank will be rescued."3 9 Yet, as dis-
cussed earlier, investors in bank deposits tend to be a suspicious lot who
do not count on the ability of the regulators to save every bank.1"' As will
be explored in Part III, the failure of market discipline has another
explanation.
III. Consequences of Market Discipline
The previous Parts have suggested two significant problems with
encouraging market discipline by bank depositors. First, very few deposi-
tors are interested in or capable of exerting that discipline by choosing
banks primarily on the basis of risk. Second, although sufficient informa-
tion about the financial condition of banks is presently produced to enable
those depositors to predict which banks are most likely to incur financial
difficulties, depositors still may be less concerned about the chance of fail-
ure than about the ultimate disposition of failed institutions by bank
regulators.
Proponents of market discipline would have two responses to these ob-
jections. First, they would argue, if regulatory intervention to prevent
bank failure interferes with the incentives for depositors to exert market
discipline, the appropriate solution is for the regulators simply to let all
banks fail, thus forcing depositors to assume financial responsibility for
their investment decisions.' 31 Second, since saving failing banks only
encourages both bank depositors and management to take too many risks,
allowing more banks to fail ultimately will produce more risk-averse
129. Although many critics complain that all failed banks are bailed out, the record reveals that
this is not the case: from 1933 through 1983, 328 failed banks were liquidated and 340 merged. See
FDIC ANN. REP. 1983 at 14.
130. See supra text accompanying note 108.
131. Some might also suggest the removal or reduction of deposit insurance to increase the pool of
depositors who might be at risk and, therefore, exert market discipline. See ABA STUwY, supra note
2, at 187; but see supra text accompanying note 42.
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banks, resulting in fewer bank failures and less need for any regulatory
intervention.
The problem with these responses is that the current failure of market
discipline is not the result of government bailouts of failed banks. In real-
ity, depositors do not behave as if they feel assured of government protec-
tion from losses. If federally assisted dispositions of failed banks really
have made depositors complacent about bank risk, one would not expect
the bank runs by sophisticated depositors that routinely take place. 13 2
Why then doesn't market discipline in the deposit market work as well
in practice as in theory? As will be demonstrated, the problem is not the
failure of depositors to exert discipline but the form that their discipline
takes. Effective market discipline requires more than that depositors pun-
ish erring banks by causing them to fail. More important, market disci-
pline must create positive incentives for all banks to limit their risk-taking
to acceptable levels. If the reaction of the deposit market to any negative
information is always a sudden and drastic reduction in bank funding-a
bank run-neither the target bank's management nor its remaining depos-
itors will have much opportunity to react to the market's negative assess-
ment by reducing their risk-taking. As will be elaborated in this Part, the
tendency of the deposit market to react precipitously to certain negative
information has disastrous consequences for both the victims of market
discipline and the deposit market itself.
A. Effect on Depositors
1. Liquidity and Bank Runs
Effective market discipline depends upon the ability of depositors to
respond to changes in bank risk. If depositors were prevented from react-
ing to increased risk, the preferences of the deposit market would not be
felt by bank management. Yet, ironically, the very ability of depositors to
respond quickly may itself be responsible for their failure to exert effective
discipline. If it is too easy for a depositor to react to negative news, he has
no reason to try to predict bank problems in advance. He can afford to
wait until the fire has spread throughout the entire building before taking
his leave. In fact, for adequate compensation he may even enter the burn-
ing building, knowing that he can easily escape before the roof collapses.
Most depositors fit this description. As deposits are withdrawable upon
demand or have short maturities, depositors can always retrieve their
funds quickly when problems appear at a particular bank without incur-
ring brokerage fees or other charges. Thus, unlike stockholders or
132. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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long-term creditors who in order to liquidate their investments are depen-
dent on a trading market that reflects current information,"13 depositors
need not expend any effort to identify risk before it leads to serious finan-
cial problems. Moreover, because of their ability to protect themselves eas-
ily when risk-taking does not pay off, depositors are not deterred from
investing by the aggressive behavior of bank management.
Of course, this characteristic of deposit liabilities is not unique. Com-
mercial paper and short-term treasury securities are also very liquid, and
both have more active secondary trading markets than bank deposits.
Moreover, at times the liquidity of deposits may be more apparent than
real. If all depositors attempt to retrieve their deposits at the same time,
their bank will run out of funds, and some deposits, including those of
relatively sophisticated investors, will be stuck in a closed bank.""
The real distinction between deposits and most other corporate borrow-
ings is not how the liquidity of deposits affects the depositor but how it
affects the bank. As a bank's own liquidity depends almost exclusively on
access to new deposits,1"' sudden withdrawals of deposits or failure to
renew deposit liabilities at their maturities can leave the bank without
funds to support its current operations."3 6 Such withdrawals may occur as
a result of many factors other than excessive risk-taking-false rumors,
market jitters caused by recent bank failures, or even unusual cyclical
demands for cash.'" 7 In some cases, the bank may be prepared and
weather a temporary deposit drain, or it may cover its loss of liquidity
through borrowing from other banks or the Federal Reserve. In other
cases, the outflow may be so severe or unpredictable that a previously safe
bank suddenly faces a serious liquidity crisis.
This unpredictable liquidity risk is a consideration that bank investors
must take into account in assessing the overall risk posture of their bank.
Nevertheless, depositors react to liquidity risk in a different way than they
respond to poor assets or bad management. For example, suppose a
depositor hears a rumor that his bank has serious management problems.
133. A holder of unsecured long-term debt of a company with financial problems has three
choices. It can sell the liability at a loss, it can call the debt and possibly push the borrower into
bankruptcy, or it can allow the borrower time to solve its problems. In the absence of a market for the
debt, a lender may have no choice but to continue its relationship with the borrower, for example, by
renegotiating the terms of its loan, in order to salvage any of its original investment.
134. When Penn Square Bank failed, its uninsured depositors included 139 credit unions with
total uninsured deposits of $111.5 million and 14 thrifts with total uninsured deposits of $15.6 mil-
lion. Failure of Penn Square Bank: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, 70 (1982) (Statements of Edgar F. Callahan, Chairman,
National Credit Union Administration Board, and Thomas P. Vartanian, General Counsel, Federal
Home Loan Bank Board).
135. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
137. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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The depositor could investigate the truth of the rumor in order to make a
judgment as to its probable effect on the bank's solvency. Nevertheless, he
must also consider the likelihood that his fellow depositors may not inves-
tigate the rumor but simply withdraw their funds, which they can do eas-
ily without significant cost."38 If a sufficient number of depositors do with-
draw their funds, at some point the bank will suffer a liquidity crisis,
which may itself threaten the bank's survival. Therefore, our depositor
has little reason to discover whether the rumor is true and every reason to
recover his own funds, joining the bank run.
Some other short-term investments also are vulnerable to runs. Holders
of commercial paper, like bank depositors, have little or nothing to lose by
reacting to rumors, and to the extent that many firms rely heavily on
commercial paper for funding, a similar snowball effect may occur.139 But
this lack of incentive on the part of commercial paper holders to investi-
gate the issuing firm has led to the development of arrangements through
which investors can assure themselves of quality without verification, such
as back-up lines of bank credit and the willingness of commercial paper
dealers to repurchase the paper they sell." ° No similar arrangements are
generally available to depositors."1
Further, the commercial paper market tends to be limited to a relatively
small group of sophisticated corporate investors." 2 In contrast, it is
important to remember that not all participants in the deposit market are
true investors. Although involuntary depositors will not exert market dis-
cipline, their behavior does affect their bank, thus influencing the risk
assessments of better informed depositors. A sophisticated depositor must
be concerned not only with accurate information about bank risk but also
with the reactions of involuntary depositors to false information and
rumors."" Thus, ironically, well informed depositors are forced to pay
attention to the judgments of less informed depositors, often reluctantly
following them to the doors of the bank. Unlike in the corporate securities
138. See supra text accompanying note 133.
139. See W. Melton, supra note 45, at 157-58 (bankruptcy of Penn Central Transportation
Company, which had $82 million of commercial paper outstanding, led to general run on commercial
paper market, threatening solvency of several other firms).
140. For a discussion of the role of these and other information intermediaries in lowering verifi-
cation costs in the market for corporate securities, see generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 77,
at 604-05.
141. A few deposit brokers have committed to repurchase certificates of deposit at the prevailing
market price, see Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756
F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985), (describing Merrill Lynch's insured certificate of deposit program), but this
is still far from usual.
142. The vast majority of investors in commercial paper used to be large corporations; more
recently, they have been replaced by money market funds and other investment companies. M.
SrmuM, supra note 50, at 631.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
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market, in the deposit market bad information tends to crowd out good
information, giving depositors little reason to invest in the best possible
information about their banks.
Thus, the liquidity of deposits has several related negative implications
for market discipline. Even well informed depositors have no need to react
early to increases in bank risk, since they can pull out when imminent
disaster is threatened. Moreover, the vulnerability of banks to sudden
withdrawals of deposits requires depositors to be attentive even to errone-
ous information if it is likely to cause other less sophisticated depositors to
withdraw their funds.
This suggests that the discipline that the deposit market will impose
will take the form of sudden and devastating bank runs in response to real
or perceived threats of failure. Bank runs, however, are hardly an effective
way to achieve market discipline. First, rather than encouraging deposi-
tors to be more careful in their choice of banks, bank runs force depositors
to act upon the most unreliable forms of information. Moreover, although
effective market discipline requires that some investors bear the costs of
bank failure as punishment for excessive risk-taking, bank runs do not
even insure that the right depositors are punished. The depositors remain-
ing in a failed bank are not necessarily those who voluntarily chose to
incur risk for a higher return or even those who made no investment anal-
ysis at all, but those unlucky enough to have been at the back of the line
when the bank ran out of money.1 44
2. Avoiding Bank Runs
Bank runs are undesirable from the point of view of both the target
bank and depositors, since they add another unpredictable risk to their
investment. Nevertheless, although there are several ways in which depos-
itors could protect themselves from the more devastating consequences of
bank runs, these reactions will be counterproductive in the long run. For
example, if a depositor fears the tendency of uninformed depositors to
react hastily to rumors, he might choose a bank with few involuntary
depositors. Yet this depositor would be increasing his risk in the long run,
since involuntary deposits ordinarily are far more stable than wholesale
deposits.1 45 Moreover, given the ease with which most deposits can be
withdrawn from and returned to banks, even sophisticated depositors may
be more inclined to react to rumors than to investigate them. Thus, ironi-
cally, a depositor seeking to minimize the possibility of bank runs may be
144. This may have been the explanation for the substantial volume of deposits of very sophisti-
cated investors that were caught in Penn Square Bank when it closed. See supra note 134.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
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better off in a bank with substantial involuntary deposits, which may
explain the preference of many investors for large banks."
Alternatively, a depositor could choose a bank whose assets consist pri-
marily of cash and short-term government treasury bonds that can be liq-
uidated rapidly should a sudden bank run occur. But, as suggested earlier,
in the long run such a bank may not be as "safe" as it appears.1" 7 The
return it can offer on its deposits is limited to the yield on its portfolio of
treasury securities, yet it must compete for funds not only with other more
aggressive banks but with all money market investments that offer a pre-
mium over the treasury rate. If it cannot attract sufficient deposits, even
this "safe" bank is vulnerable to a liquidity crisis. The depositor would be
better off purchasing a portfolio of government securities himself than in-
vesting in this bank.
Moreover, although some depositors may be willing to sacrifice return
for the sake of reduced vulnerability to bank runs, it is unclear how high
a price depositors will pay for safety. For example, uninsured money
market mutual funds offered by brokerage houses, which paid higher
rates than ordinary bank transaction accounts, were enormously successful
in luring insured deposits away from banks. 4 Many depositors deliber-
ately choose to invest in banks that take substantial risks in order to earn
higher returns than safer banks can offer. A depositor may even choose to
invest in a bank whose failure is probable so long as it offers a return
commensurate with the risk. For example, a deposit paying twelve percent
per annum in a bank that is expected to fail in ten years is a relatively
safe gamble. 49 Therefore, there is no reason to believe that, if left to their
own devices, depositors will avoid the devastating consequences of bank
runs by choosing the least risky banks even if such banks are more likely
to survive a run. Hence, bank runs are an inevitable part of the deposit
market.
B. Effect on Bank Management
Market discipline requires more than simply that depositors take risk
into account in making investment decisions. It also requires that bank
management perceives and responds to depositors' risk preferences. If
146. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
147. See supra text accompanying note 126.
148. See McCue, Is Deposit Insurance Necessary?, Am. Banker, Apr. 15, 1982, at 14, col. 1
(discussing success of unregulated money market funds).
149. Alternatively, our depositor can minimize his risk of loss without sacrificing return simply by
diversifying his investments. If he allocates his funds among ten different banks offering different
mixes of risk and return, even if two of the banks fail, he may still receive a higher net return than if
he invests in a single "safe" bank. See generally J. LoRIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET:
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE, 171-97 (1973).
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banks can remain indifferent to depositors' preferences, the level of risk-
taking by banks will not be affected by depositors' allocation of funds.
Therefore, adequate incentives must exist for banks to be aware of and
react to the market's assessment of their performance. On the other hand,
if its negative effects are too severe, market discipline may do little but
increase the risks to which banks are subject. Banks cannot be so sensitive
to a shift in depositors' preferences that they have no effective opportunity
to respond to the market's signals.
1. Registering Risk Preferences Through the Capital Pricing
Mechanism
In a competitive capital market, the incentive for banks to respond to
depositors' risk preferences seems clear. A firm that consistently ignores
market signals should rapidly lose deposits to other institutions, resulting
in higher funding costs and eventual failure. Therefore, at least in the case
of firms that regularly use the wholesale deposit market,150 management
may already have a reason to limit its risk-taking to a level acceptable to
depositors.
In practice, however, the very dependence of banks on the deposit mar-
ket suggests that when the signals sent by the market are strong enough to
be recognized by management,1 51 they already may be too strong to permit
an effective response. For example, the market learns that a bank that
sells wholesale certificates of deposit on a weekly basis has made a high
risk loan. The following week, purchasers of deposits demand a risk pre-
mium. If management cannot afford this increase in its cost of funds, it
may decide to alter its lending practices, but in the meantime it must sat-
isfy its ongoing funding needs. It cannot simply withdraw from the whole-
sale deposit market until it has improved its loan portfolio. Moreover, to
the extent that the unusually high premium it must now pay for deposits
affects its earnings, the market will perceive that the risk:s associated with
the bank have increased further and will penalize it accordingly. If the
market's reaction becomes too severe, the bank may be unable to meet its
funding needs.
Thus, the more sensitive a bank is to changes in the price and availabil-
ity of funds, the more likely it becomes that even mild market discipline
150. The total number of these banks may be relatively small. See supra text accompanying note
52.
151. Every increase in funding costs will not necessarily be perceived by management as a sign of
the market's displeasure. Rate variations may also reflect the frequency with which the bank sells
deposits, returns on competitive investments, and market conditions. Moreover, higher funding costs
will not hurt the bank so long as it can employ those funds profitably without incurring greatly
increased risk.
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may lead to a liquidity crisis. Moreover, as the deposit market tends to
react to bad news not by demanding gradual rate increases but by sudden
bank runs, 5 ' management has less incentive to improve its market image
than to find ways to shield itself from the devastating effects of market
pressure. A firm already facing a liquidity risk due to increased funding
costs will not have the time to convert its risky portfolio into safer invest-
ments, thereby eventually winning back its lost capital suppliers. Instead,
it may be forced to subsidize its expensive deposits by incurring even more
risk, either finding increasingly speculative uses for its funds to produce
higher yields or buying even more costly deposits.'
2. The Market for Control
If the pricing structure of the wholesale deposit market does not create
incentives for management to control risk-taking, is there any other mar-
ket mechanism that can bring about the proper degree of discipline? In
the corporate securities market, management's performance may be disci-
plined by the threat of a hostile takeover by an outsider that believes it
can improve the market value of the firm's shares by more efficient man-
agement.' 4 Therefore, we might expect that a bank that ignores the mar-
ket's risk preferences and thereby experiences difficulty in obtaining
deposits would be vulnerable to a takeover by another firm that could
make a profit by reducing the target's funding costs.
This pressure on management can be effective only if the possibility of
a hostile takeover is real. Since banks are protected against takeover by
state and federal laws limiting the concentration of banking resources'
and preventing cross-industry acquisitions, 5 the threat of a change in
control is virtually nonexistent for many banks.'57 Bank regulators are
152. See supra text accompanying notes 133-44.
153. For example, the bank may employ money brokers to sell its deposits, thereby incurring a
brokerage fee as well as the high interest rates paid in the wholesale market. See Harless, Brokered
Deposits: Issues and Alternatives, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., Mar. 1984, at 14.
154. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1173 (1981). But see Coffee, Regulating the Market for
Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1204 (1984) (arguing that value of this discipline is limited when current
management's inefficiency is either not extreme enough to justify a tender offer premium or too
extreme to satisfy a bidder's level of risk aversion).
155. Restrictions on interstate acquisitions by bank holding companies with some exceptions limit
potential bidders to in-state institutions. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 3(d), 12 U.S.C. §
1842(d) (1982).
156. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982) (restrictions on affiliations between banks and securities
firms); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1982) (limits on permissible activities of nonbank affiliates of bank
holding companies).
157. In addition, the requirement of prior regulatory approval for the acquisition of a controlling
block of shares makes hostile takeovers more difficult in banking than in other industries. See Midlan-
tic Banks, Inc., 70 FED. RESERVE BULL. 776 (1984).
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occasionally willing to ignore these restrictions in order to facilitate the
acquisition of a failing bank,15 8 but the risks associated with such an ac-
quisition may be too high to attract a bidder interested solely in profit
maximization. Although acquisition of a failed bank's franchise tradition-
ally has been a way for a healthy bank to obtain a foothold in another
state,15 9 the existence of other less costly ways to evade the restrictions on
interstate banking, such as loan production offices, consumer banks, and
shared electronic teller networks, has reduced the demand for failed banks
among buyers.'" Moreover, as the bank has already failed, the threat of a
change in control at this point has come too late to have any disciplinary
effect on the bank's management. 1 '
C. Effect on the Banking System
The ultimate goal of market discipline is to encourage more effective
risk management by banks, which in turn should lead to fewer bank fail-
ures and safer banks. Yet market discipline has a down side: Some banks
must fail in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the discipline. Occa-
sional bank failure may be a small price to pay for encouraging more
responsible decision-making at the majority of banks. Yet market disci-
pline by depositors will have precisely the opposite effect, actually making
the banking system as a whole less safe. This will occur because the
effects of bank failure cannot be confined to the erring bank and its inves-
tors. The punishment is visited on innocent banks and their depositors as
well.
The systemic or external 6 ' effects of bank failure have frequently been
asserted, 6 ' but it is useful to review them in order to demonstrate how
they interfere with effective market discipline by depositors. Of course, all
business failure imposes certain external costs on parties other than the
firm and its investors, Although bank failure may result in substantial
dislocation for local customers who depended on the bank for credit and
other services, this effect is no more severe than the consequences of
158. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730a(m), 1785(h)(i), 1823(f) (1982) (permitting federally assisted inter-
state and cross-industry acquisitions of failing insured depository institutions).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
160. See Dunn, Merger Outlook: Subsidiaries Are Hot; Some Other Deals Are Not, Am. Banker,
Jan. 10, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
161. Although rarely used, the regulators' broad power to remove bank management for engaging
in unsafe and unsound practices or for breach of fiduciary duty is potentially a more significant
incentive to management to improve its performance than the threat of takeover. See Brickner v. Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., 747 F. 2d 1198 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding removal power).
162. For a discussion of the cause and effects of externalities in the marketplace, see generally
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
163. See, e.g., Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLiS ANN. REP.
1982 at 9-11.
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failure of any business that is central to a particular community. Although
peculiar restrictions on entry"8 4 mean that the closing of one bank may
result in a net loss of services in its market, this problem is not unique to
banking"' and might be addressed by improving the competitiveness of
the industry. Moreover, banking skills are sufficiently transferable that
the failure of one bank will not deprive the market of a unique service.' 66
Finally, the administrative costs of closing and liquidating banks are high,
but so are the expenses associated with corporate bankruptcy and reorgan-
ization proceedings.1 67
Nevertheless, the most significant cost associated with bank failures is
not their impact on the individual bank's own customers or community,
but their broader effect on the liquidity of the banking system as a whole.
If a corporation defaults on its bond payments, the bondholders have been
deprived of access to their funds to the same extent as depositors in a
failed bank. Nevertheless, even if this default has raised questions about
the creditworthiness of every other corporate borrower, alternative sources
of funds, such as bank deposits, have not been eliminated either for bond-
holders in need of cash or other corporate issuers temporarily unable to
raise funds in the debt markets. Even if some bondholders default on pay-
ments to their own creditors, precipitating further failures, so long as
banks remain as back-up sources of liquidity, a financial panic can be
contained.'68
In contrast, default by a bank results in a net loss of a source of liquid-
ity for which no alternative exists except other banks. These remaining
banks must themselves weather the sudden increased demand for liquidity
either by liquidating assets or by selling new deposits. 6 ' Since the only
way to stem the domino effect of credit withdrawal caused by any business
failure is to have at least some firms that remain ready and willing to
provide liquidity, 7 ° it is essential that these sources of funding be secured.
Although the repercussions of individual bank failure can be tolerated if a
sufficient number of healthy banks remain in operation, as the liquidity
164. See supra note 155 (restrictions on interstate banking).
165. For example, a similar argument could be made with respect to such significant industrial
firms as Chrysler and Conrail.
166. Competition by nonbanking firms offering bank-like products such as money market funds
has created a new market for bankers' skills.
167. See Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 CoLUM. L.
RFv. 527, 529 (1983).
168. See Corrigan, supra note 163, at 10.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
170. This idea was first expressed by Walter Bagehot, who in his 1873 work Lombard Street
proposed that the Bank of England should be ready to lend freely (albeit at high interest rates) in
times of financial panic. See W. MFLTON, supra note 45, at 155.
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crisis spreads, each successive failure puts additional strain on the rest of
the banking system.
The possibility of a systemic liquidity crisis resulting from a single
bank failure is not a cost that depositors will take into account in assessing
the risks associated with individual banks. No depositor will exhibit suffi-
cient altruism to risk losing his investment by leaving his funds in a fail-
ing bank in order to prevent a bank run from spreading to other institu-
tions. Such a reaction might be expected only from a depositor who is
either ignorant or insensitive to risk. To the contrary, effective market
discipline would require such a depositor to respond to the increased risk
at his bank by joining the run.
Further, the vulnerability of all banks to liquidity woes makes it impos-
sible for depositors to identify and avoid banks whose failure will pose a
special threat to the banking system. Recent experience has demonstrated
that neither the size of an institution nor the volume of its deposits deter-
mines the impact of its failure on other banks. The uncontrollable demand
for liquidity that leads to systemic liquidity crises is caused by general
uncertainty about the solvency of the banking system171 and, in particular,
the guarantee of uninterrupted liquidity that banks provide. This uncer-
tainty may follow the failure of a large bank because of its importance as
a supplier of liquidity to a number of smaller banks.172 On the other
hand, interdependence works the other way as well: The failure of a small
bank may have a serious impact on much larger institutions with which it
has significant business relationships, such as loan participations or lines
of credit.173 Moreover, a local banking crisis, although relatively insignifi-
cant in terms of actual losses, may have repercussions in the national and
international financial markets if uncertainty exists about the regulators'
ability to prevent the crisis from spreading.1"4
Thus, bank runs and failures create risks not only for the individual
bank and its investors but for other banks as well. Although in theory the
possibility of spillover effects might have the beneficial effect of forcing
banks to be more discriminating in their choice of correspondent banks,'
the connection between a failed bank and other banks experiencing
171. As one observer noted, the solvency of banks largely depends on "make believe": the mainte-
nance of public confidence in the banking system. R. Mot.EY, THE FIRsT NEw DEAL 171 (1966).
172. For example, 66 banks had an exposure to Continental Illinois in the form of deposits or
other investments in excess of 100% of their capital. See Continental Hearings, supra note 54, at 434
(FDIC Staff Report).
173. This is illustrated by the impact of the failure of Penn Square Bank on its much larger
correspondents, especially Continental Illinois. See supra note 96.
174. See, e.g., Kilborn, World Markets Reacting to Ills of U.S. Banks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26,
1985, at Al, col. I (closing of state-insured Ohio thrifts, raising questions about solvency of all state
insurance funds, blamed for instability and decline of dollar in foreign markets).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
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liquidity crises may be more tenuous, such as a similarity of names or
location. Thus, spillover effects are too unfocused to have any impact on
bank risk-taking, except in some cases to increase it.17 6 Moreover, deposi-
tors facing still another unpredictable risk associated with bank deposits
may now be convinced of the futility of any attempt to predict the future
of individual banks and may simply shop for high rates, relying on their
liquidity to protect them in the event of trouble.
IV. Making Market Discipline Work
The foregoing discussion has illustrated that uncertainty is the principal
enemy of market discipline. Effective market discipline presumes the abil-
ity of depositors to make accurate judgments about bank risk that will be
reflected in their investment decisions and recognized by bank manage-
ment. Yet the deposit market is fraught with uncertainty about the risks
associated with banks. First, the market must take into account the uncer-
tainty surrounding the regulatory disposition of banks in the event of fail-
ure.17 7 Second, the market must deal with the uncertainty that accurate or
inaccurate news about a bank's financial condition could spark a bank
run, producing a wholly new threat to the bank that bears little relation to
the original risk.1 8 Finally, the market must accept the uncertainty cre-
ated by the spillover effects of one bank's failure on other healthy
institutions.1 7
9
All of this uncertainty discourages depositors from engaging in sus-
tained financial analysis of banks. Because a bank's condition can change
so quickly, a depositor has more incentive to monitor rumors than to ex-
pend any effort to predict in advance the financial prospects of his bank.
Likewise, bank management looking for a way to reduce this uncertainty
will be less inclined to control its risk-taking over the long term than to
find ways to limit the bank's sensitivity to the market in the short term,
even if that means incurring greater risk in the long run. 8 0
Thus, the discipline presently exerted by the deposit market increases
the risk of bank runs without causing either bank depositors or manage-
ment to decrease their risk-taking. If the purpose of relying on market
discipline is to reduce bank risk, it will not achieve its intended goal. In
fact, the very purpose of current regulatory intervention to save failed
176. If as a result of one bank failure banks generally are perceived to be more risky, they will
have to pay higher rates to attract funds away from nonbank competitors, which itself will increase
bank risk. See supra note 153.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 111-21 (liquidation risk).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 133-44 (liquidity risk).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 162-76 (systemic risk).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53.
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banks is to soften the consequences of the harsh discipline visited upon
banks by the deposit market. 8 ' Abolishing this protective regulation,
thereby returning to a state of nature, is not a solution to the problem of
increased bank risk.
Although market discipline is no substitute for regulation to control
bank risk, market discipline and regulation need not be mutually exclusive
approaches. Thus, regulatory intervention can be tailored to reduce some
of the uncertainty that currently interferes with effective market
discipline. Regulation designed to make market discipline work would
have two beneficial effects. First, such regulation might encourage deposi-
tors to exert some pressure on bank management to control risk. Second,
and perhaps more significantly, such regulation might make the task of
the bank regulators to identify, control, and dispose of troubled banks
somewhat easier by reducing the current tendency of depositors actually to
contribute to bank risk by ignoring financial condition in choosing their
banks.'82
How then can bank regulation be crafted to reduce the uncertainty that
presently discourages depositors from evaluating the financial condition of
their banks? The most effective and simple approach would be simply to
prevent bank failure. If no banks failed, depositors would have no reason
to join bank runs and systemic liquidity crises could be prevented.
Of course, if no bank failure meant that no depositor ever suffered any
losses, depositors would still have no reason to be attentive to any infor-
mation about the financial condition of their banks. Yet prevention of
bank failure does not necessarily mean that depositors and bank manage-
ment will pay no price for taking risks. Even now, depositors pay some
price in the form of lost liquidity or interest when their bank is saved
through a federally assisted merger.' 8 ' Thus, the process by which failed
banks are saved can be designed to incorporate certain risks and rewards
for risk-taking. This Part will propose one such system of incentives the
regulators might employ in disposing of failed banks that would
encourage depositors to pay more attention to financial condition when
choosing banks.
181. Discouraging bank runs was one of the original goals of the deposit insurance system,
including the provisions permitting federally assisted mergers of failed banks. See M. FRIEDMAN & A.
SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867-1960 435-36 n.14 (1963).
182. Depositors' inattention to financial condition leads them to put money in risky banks, actu-
ally enabling such banks to grow even bigger. When such banks eventually fail, their inflated size may
make their ultimate disposition much more difficult and expensive for the regulators. See supra text
accompanying notes 105-08.
183. See supra text accompanying note 122.
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A. Current Disposition of Failed Banks
As noted earlier, the regulators' choice when faced with a failing bank
is threefold: they may attempt to keep the bank alive through direct assis-
tance, 84 they may close the bank and liquidate its assets, paying off
insured depositors, 85 or they may arrange a merger with a healthy
bank. 8 The choice of alternatives presently rests primarily on the cost to
the insurance fund of paying off insured depositors as opposed to provid-
ing federal assistance to the failing bank or to another firm to facilitate an
acquisition.'8 7 Nevertheless, within this framework, the regulators have
exercised considerable discretion in handling failing banks. Banks have
been kept open through government lending so that a merger might ulti-
mately be arranged.' 8 Novel forms of direct assistance, including capital
injections, have been provided. 89 In several failures the regulators have
experimented with modified payoffs whereby only insured deposits and
selected assets of the failed bank have been sold to an acquiring firm. 90
Thus, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the disposition of failed
banks because of the inability of the market to predict either which solu-
tion will be the least costly or how the regulators will react to individual
bank failures. This uncertainty contributes to the already powerful incen-
tives in the deposit market for investors to monitor rumors. As previously
demonstrated,' 9 ' bank runs make a depositor's analysis of the actual
financial condition of his bank irrelevant the moment the bank's liquidity
is threatened. At that point, the depositor's risk of loss depends on the
magnitude of the run, the bank's ability to withstand the run, and the
possibility that the regulators will provide some assistance that will pro-
tect all depositors. The inability to predict accurately any of these three
variables, coupled with the ease with which deposits can be liquidated,
provide a good reason for a depositor simply to join the bank run. In fact,
under the circumstances it is puzzling why depositors ever engage in any
financial analysis of their banks.
184. See supra note 116.
185. See supra text accompanying note 111.
186. See supra text accompanying note 112.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
188. See supra note 106 (Franklin National Bank).
189. See supra note 116 (Continental Illinois).
190. Uninsured depositors have received an advance payment of a portion of their claims from the
government based on the regulators' estimate of their recovery after liquidation of the bank's unsold
assets. See Rosenstein, FDIC's Handling of Two Failures Underlines Policy, Am. Banker, Mar. 20,
1984, at 3, col. 3.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 135-38.
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Bank runs themselves are the inevitable by-products of the liquidity of
deposits. 9" Yet the uncertainty surrounding the disposition of failed banks
is regulator-made. Current regulatory policy regarding failed banks
encourages depositors to ignore financial condition and gamble on govern-
ment protection. Nevertheless, this gambling occurs not because in fact
some banks are saved, but because depositors realize that they cannot pre-
dict which banks will be saved.
Of course, depositors would no longer be able to gamble on government
protection if no banks were saved. Yet, as this Article has argued, such a
policy would not lead to effective market discipline. Depositors would be
even less likely to pay attention to financial information about their banks
in a market without any protection from unpredictable bank runs. 93 On
the other hand, depositors also would have no reason to gamble if regula-
tory policy as to which banks will be saved were based on predictable
factors. The disposition of the bank in the event of failure would simply
be an element in a depositor's analysis of the risks associated with his
bank. Moreover, such an analysis could be performed at the time the
depositor made his investment rather than in the heat of a bank run.
Depositors would simply choose those banks that are candidates for gov-
ernment rescue in the event of failure.
The regulatory criteria for saving failed banks not only must be clear
and predictable but must bear some relation to the financial condition of
the failed bank. For example, were the regulators simply to rescue all
banks with assets over $100 million, uncertainty would be reduced, but
depositors would not engage in more financial analysis of their banks;
they would simply favor large banks regardless of their condition. Thus,
in order to encourage depositors to be more attentive to the current finan-
cial condition of their banks, the same factors that determine the financial
strength of a bank as a going concern should also affect its disposition in
the event of failure. Just because a bank fails does not mean that it is
completely worthless. It may still have performing loans, a good location,
or a potentially valuable base of core deposits. As these are the same qual-
ities investors should look to in evaluating the risk posture of solvent
banks, reliance on these factors in determining the fate of a bank upon
failure would give depositors another reason to be attentive to financial
condition even in a market vulnerable to unpredictable bank runs and
failures.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 138-44.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 180-81.
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B. Market-Based Criteria
The previous discussion has suggested that the best way to encourage
depositors to pay attention to the financial health of banks in a market in
which deposit runs and failures discourage financial analysis is to base
regulatory dispositions of failed banks on clear and predictable factors that
relate to financial condition. In other words, attentive investors should be
rewarded for paying attention to the financial condition of their banks,
while inattentive investors should bear the losses that follow from invest-
ing in a risky bank. Implementation of this approach, however, may prove
difficult in the majority of bank failures. Although occasionally some
"good" banks may fail due entirely to external causes such as the spillover
effects of other bank failures, 1' 4 ordinarily bank failure is the result of a
combination of factors, such as troubled loans, poor management deci-
sions, and liquidity problems, which may or may not have been apparent
while the bank was a going concern. How then can the regulators devise a
system for the disposition of failed banks that will take account of their
financial condition prior to the final crisis that leads to failure, at the time
when investors have the opportunity to choose among banks on the basis
of the banks' risk postures?
I suggest that the most predictable and reliable criterion by which to
distinguish among failed banks is the value of their assets. Unlike many
factors that affect a bank's financial health, asset value can be monitored
by depositors long in advance of failure on the basis of public informa-
tion.195 In contrast to liquidity difficulties, specific problems in a bank's
loan portfolio reveal themselves sufficiently early that the bank can be
recognized and avoided by investors. Moreover, the overall composition of
a healthy bank's assets is itself a significant predictor of the bank's future
prospects. For example, if a bank's loan portfolio is so concentrated in a
particular region or industry that an economic downturn could lead to
substantial loan losses, the risks associated with that bank should be
apparent long before a crisis occurs that causes the bank's failure. 1"
In addition, unlike such variables as the level of a bank's deposits, a
bank's asset value will remain relatively constant from the time a bank
run begins until such time as the regulators decide to close the bank's
doors. Thus, the market's valuation of the bank's assets before failure will
bear some relationship to the actual value of its assets after failure. The
194. See supra text accompanying notes 175-76.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
196. For example, the difference between those agricultural banks that have failed and those that
have weathered their loan losses may have been the latter banks' more diversified portfolios. See supra
note 124.
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value of the failed bank's assets also can be estimated quickly by the regu-
lators as soon as the bank is closed. In fact, such post-failure valuations
are already made by the regulators in order to determine whether a feder-
ally assisted merger is a feasible solution. 19 7
Thus, asset value is a predictable and accurate indicator of a bank's
financial position prior to failure. How then can it be used by the regula-
tors to determine the fate of a failed bank? I propose three changes in the
regulators' current method of handling failed banks that would make asset
value the primary factor in the disposition of failed institutions. First, the
regulators must adopt a clear threshold test based on asset value that will
initially determine when a failed bank is eligible for any federal
assistance. The regulators would arrange a merger for or provide direct
assistance to a failed bank only if its asset value at the time of closing met
certain minimum criteria for banks of its size and market position. 98
Banks falling below this threshold would automatically be liquidated.1 9
Ideally, such a threshold should encourage depositors to monitor the
condition of their bank's assets on an ongoing basis to insure that they
continue to meet the regulators' criteria for banks of their size. If asset
value drops below the threshold, attentive depositors will seek alternative
investments for their funds. Of course, investors' estimates of their bank's
asset value may not always turn out to be accurate. Often the precise
value of a failed bank's assets cannot be confirmed even by the regulators
until a careful audit is performed after the bank is closed. This suggests
that any threshold must be set relatively low in order to give depositors
some margin for error in their estimates of asset value.200 Nevertheless,
the purpose of the floor is not to limit the number of banks that are saved
but simply to make the initial decision to save or liquidate a failed bank
more predictable, encouraging depositors to monitor the asset value of
their banks and avoid those of truly poor quality.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
198. In setting the thresholds for banks of different sizes, the regulators should not only look to
the absolute value of performing assets but also take into account overall risk composition and profile
and loan concentrations. The regulators have recently proposed such a weighting system for bank
assets in connection with their proposal to establish a risk-based test for capital adequacy. See Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Proposed Rulemaking: Bank Holding Companies and
Change in Bank Control; Capital Maintenance; Supplemental Adjusted Capital Measure, 51 Fed.
Reg. 3976 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225) (proposed Jan. 31, 1986). However the threshold is
determined, the criteria must be made public so that depositors can use the same standards in assess-
ing their banks.
199. Alternatively, the regulators could arrange a modified payoff in which only insured deposits
were assumed by another bank. See supra text accompanying note 190. In either case, the intended
result would be to relegate all uninsured investors to liquidation proceedings.
200. A low threshold would also lessen the possibility that a policy of too frequent liquidations
will lead to more systemic liquidity crises. See supra text accompanying notes 171-75.
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If the floor is low, then, as is presently the practice, the regulators will
be committed in the majority of cases to arranging a merger or providing
direct assistance to those banks that do not attract bidders. But this should
no longer mean that all depositors are automatically guaranteed full re-
covery. Thus, even if a bank is saved, depositors who have assumed the
risk of investing in a bank that has failed should pay some price for their
protection from the full consequences of their risk-taking.
Ideally, these depositors, like beneficiaries of private insurance, should
be charged a higher premium for protection the next time they seek the
safety of deposits. As that is not feasible, they should at least expect to lose
any risk premium they were paid to invest in the failed bank. This could
be accomplished by limiting uninsured depositors' withdrawals from a
failing bank after such time as the regulators determine that it might be
closed," ° ' as well as their recovery in a subsequent merger or other dispo-
sition, to the principal amount of their investment after deduction of any
interest payments or other return they have already received on their
deposits.202
For example, assume the prevailing market rate of interest on one-year
$100,000 deposits is ten percent. Bank A, because of its risky loan portfo-
lio, must pay its depositors eleven percent, while Bank B pays the market
rate. If both banks fail, a $100,000 depositor in either bank will be enti-
tled to recoyer only $100,000 less any interest he already has received on
his deposit. Nevertheless, Bank A's depositor will suffer the greater loss
on his investment, giving up $11,000 of expected return as opposed to
$10,000 for Bank B's depositor. Thus, the price an uninsured depositor
will pay for protection will depend on the degree of risk originally associ-
ated with the investment as reflected in its risk premium.2 03
Finally, some provision has to be made for the possibility that the failed
bank's assets turn out to be of poorer quality than the regulators' prelimi-
nary estimate, making a merger or direct assistance more expensive to
201. See supra text accompanying note 127 (regulators' discretion to determine when a failing
bank can be closed). Such a provision will enable the regulators to catch depositors who try to protect
their profits by withdrawing their funds just before the bank is closed.
202. Of course, as previously demonstrated, involuntary depositors cannot be expected to engage
in additional financial analysis of banks; hence, penalizing them for taking risks is pointless. See
supra text accompanying notes 41-47. Thus, fully insured depositors should at least continue to re-
ceive the same protection in a federally assisted merger or disposition of a failed bank that they would
receive in a liquidation, namely, complete recovery. Although some uninsured depositors also qualify
as involuntary depositors, their deposits tend to be either non-interest or low interest-bearing transac-
tion accounts such as checking or payroll accounts. See supra text accompanying note 45. These
depositors therefore would not risk significant losses under my proposal for forfeiture of interest.
203. Since denying one group of creditors-uninsured depositors-in a closed bank any part of
their claims may violate the requirement in many bank liquidation statutes for pro rata distribution of
bank assets to all creditors, see supra note 112, implementation of this part of my proposal may
require Congressional action. Moreover, any interference with depositors' expectations under their
deposit contracts would necessitate clear advance notice and consent.
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arrange than anticipated. Under the current system, in these cases the
regulators are forced to liquidate the bank or delay disposition until a less
costly solution can be devised.20 4 Such delays have the negative effect of
increasing the uncertainty surrounding regulatory dispositions of failed
banks. Therefore, once the decision is made that a bank passes the thresh-
old test for federal intervention, a merger or assistance must be arranged
promptly. In exchange for this certainty, however, any unexpected costs
incurred in arranging this disposition should be borne by the uninsured
depositors, not by the government.2" 5 .
This could be accomplished in the following way. Based on their own
initial valuation of the failed bank's assets and liabilities, the regulators
would determine the amount of federal assistance they anticipate will be
required to arrange a merger or to keep the bank open.206 If the financial
assistance ultimately required to arrange a merger or other disposition
turns out to exceed this estimate, the right of uninsured depositors to have
their total investment assumed by an acquiring bank or otherwise pro-
tected would be reduced correspondingly on a pro rata basis.
For example, the regulators initially value failed Bank A's assets at
$10. If Bank A has liabilities of $20, the regulators will provide financial
assistance to arrange a merger up to a maximum of $10. If the only offer
for Bank A requires federal assistance of $12, the regulators will reduce
the total amount of uninsured deposits which the bidder must assume by
$2, thereby also reducing the assistance required by the bidder by $2.207
Adoption of my approach to the disposition of failed banks has the vir-
tue of requiring very few changes to the existing regulatory system. The
regulators will go through the same process of valuing a failed bank's
assets and arranging a merger. Moreover, because most depositors will no
longer automatically be entitled to reimbursement in full in the resulting
merger, disposition of failed banks will not become more costly even if as
many or more banks are saved as under the current system.
In fact, under my proposed system, the cost of handling bank failures
should actually decline in the long run as incentives are restored for
depositors to monitor the asset values of their banks. These incentives in-
evitably will be strongest for depositors at the margin: those who are faced
with the real possibility of a bank run and who must decide whether to
204. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
205. Again, there is reason to provide complete protection for fully insured depositors. See supra
note 202.
206. In order to comply with existing law, this should not exceed the cost of paying off insured
depositors. See supra note 114.
207. In exchange for any unpaid portion of their liabilities, uninsured depositors will participate
along with the insurance fund in the proceeds of liquidation of any assets not purchased by the
acquiring bank.
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withdraw their funds or to weather the run. These depositors are most
likely to be concerned about the uncertainty surrounding the disposition of
failed banks under the current regulatory system. Hence, more certainty
as to the likely disposition of their bank in the event of failure should
affect these depositors' behavior.
For example, assume that a bank with strong assets is threatened by a
bank run. A depositor deciding whether to join the run will be able to
determine through an evaluation of the bank's asset position that the bank
will be rescued if it ultimately fails. The depositor therefore can rest as-
sured that in the event of failure his losses will be limited. In fact, the
more valuable his bank's assets are, the less likely it becomes that he will
suffer any loss upon failure apart from lost interest on his investment.20 8
Yet if he withdraws his funds, he may not find an alternative investment
that offers a return comparable to that expected on his deposit even as-
suming his bank does fail. Under these circumstances, depositors may no
longer conclude that the cost of joining a bank run is always less than that
of investing in information about the financial condition of their bank.
In addition, my approach should curb the depositor's inclination to
react to what he thinks will be the probable response of other depositors
to the threat of a bank run. Unlike under the current system, the deposi-
tor can be certain that, so long as his bank meets the threshold test for
asset value, his losses will be limited no matter how many other depositors
withdraw their funds. Thus, the depositor is under less pressure to hurry
to recover his money before other less sophisticated depositors panic. To
the contrary, as suggested above, he may decide to risk the loss of interest
and leave his money in the bank. Most important, the depositor knows
that if enough of his fellow depositors make a similar decision, his bank
will actually weather the run and depositors will suffer no loss of either
money or convenience. The cost to both the depositors and the banking
system of a bank failure can be completely avoided.
The assessment by a depositor in a bank with poor quality assets will
be different. Such a depositor may have deliberately chosen the bank
because it offered high rates, gambling on the liquidity of his deposit or
the chance of government intervention to protect himself in the event of
failure. Under my approach, however, such a depositor cannot count on
receiving any federal assistance at all if the value of the bank's assets falls
below the threshold. Moreover, even if the bank does qualify for assis-
tance, the depositor will lose the very profits that caused him to invest in
208. A bank with valuable assets is likely to attract such high bids from potential merger partners
that the regulators will not be forced to prorate the amount of deposits that must be assumed by the
acquiring bank. See supra text accompanying notes 204-07.
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this bank. These risks should persuade some depositors to avoid low qual-
ity banks. To the extent that depositors can be discouraged from putting
money in such banks, the ultimate cost to the insurance fund of liquida-
tion and paying off insured depositors upon failure may be significantly
reduced.
Conclusion
As more banks fail, the debate over market discipline will continue.
This Article has argued that greater reliance on market discipline to
reduce bank risk is likely to prove counterproductive. Bank runs and fail-
ures are proof that market discipline of a sort already takes place.
Depositors already react to the unpredictable risks associated with their
banks by quickly liquidating their investments.
Moreover, bank risk is increasing. Fiercer competition in the banking
industry, in part produced by recent deregulation, inevitably will lead to
more bank failures. It also will result in greater interdependence among
banks as existing banks fail or are acquired by other banks." 9 In a bank-
ing system with fewer and more interdependent banks, it is all the more
likely that any single failure will have a significant impact on the remain-
ing institutions. The consequence for the deposit market will be greater
risk, more uncertainty, and more frequent bank runs.
In view of this increasing risk, there is little point in discussing how
market discipline might work in theory when in practice it will do nothing
to achieve a safer banking system. Instead, more attention should be given
to improving existing regulatory tools to control bank risk. Nevertheless,
understanding how risk affects the deposit market does have some bearing
on this task. Although market discipline cannot replace regulation, the
deposit market should be enlisted to assist the regulators rather than mak-
ing their effort to control bank risk more difficult. My proposal would
restructure the existing regulatory approach to failed banks with the goal
of encouraging depositors to favor those banks that impose the lowest costs
on the government in the event a rescue becomes necessary. In this way,
the regulators could bank on depositors to assist them in fighting the
growing cost of living with bank risk.
209. Some estimates suggest that through mergers and failures one in three independent banks
will disappear by 1990. See W. MEI:rON, supra note 45, at 198.
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